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Preface 
In V'iev of the growing interest in Korea's activ'e role in global eco­
nomic development and of the fal that Korea is expected to be a signifi­
canlt aid donor country in tile 1990s, it is importanito review Korea's past
aid perfornance and to reexamine tile direction of Korea's aid policy for 
the IQ90s. A joint ef'frt by Prof'essor Sooyong Kim of Sogang University 
and Dr. Wan-Soon Kim of the International Trade and IBusiness Institute 
and Korea Univecsity Iufillls this long-felt neeld. In he ma ii, they re'iev 
the performance of Korea's official development assistance (ODA) 
prograin and discuss major policy issues oflODA that the coniill expects
to face in iC I990s. While the lack oflprevious sttidies on this Subject has 
posed a great difficuly to the authors, they have produced an in-depth
work on Korean developniem assistance "Or the first time in English. 
This study wis firsi suggestcd in September 1990 by Mr. Jacob Guilt,
resident representative oflthe UNDPat Seoul. Theauthors thank UNDP for 
their financial suppont for the research and Mr. Guijt for the tnany
insightful discussions they had with hi oil the sUbject. Ronlulo Garcia, 
then deputy resident iepresentati,,e of the UNDP, provided valuable 
comments ol an earlier draft. 
In various stages of the rescarch, the authors also depended on numer­
ous Korean government officials for infrormation and ideas abouit Korea's 
aid policy. Te authors are particularly gratcful to the following officials 
vi 
for their kind support and cooperation: Sun Ok Kim (Director General), 
Byun Jae-Jin (Director), and Nam-Ki Hong (Deputy Director) of the Eco­
nomic Planning Board; Sam Hoon Kim (Director General), JeeJoon Yoon 
(Deputy Director General), and Daesik Kim (Deputy Director) of tle Min­
istry of Foreign Affairs; and Jae Ho Chung (Executive Director) fthe 
Korea International Cooperation Agency. Tae-Sung Chung (Deputy Man­
ager) ofthe EXIM Bank (if Korea also provided valuableassistance. 
The conclusions and policy recommendations in this paper represent 
the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the In­
ternational Trade and Business Institute, Seoul, Korea, or the Inter­
national Center for Economic Growth, Sai Francisco, California. 
Kum Jin-Ho 
Chairman 
International Trade and Business Institute 
Seoul, Korea 
September 1992 
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Co-Publisher's Preface 
While in the past, Korea has been a significant recipient of ODA from 
developed Countries, today the country is on the verge of becoming a sig­
nificant donor of developnent assistance. Korea's active participation as 
a donor of aid is timely, not only because the world Commlunity needs ad­
ditiona! donors, but because Korea with a per capita income of aniost $6, 
00can nowaffOrd to take this step.
 
Development assistance from Korea began as early as 
 1963 and has 
sincegrown. The paper reviews Korean OD,,and compares it with ODA of 
other developed and developing countries. The types of assistance 
offered, the distribution of aid, and Ihe (luality Of the aid are examined. 
The authors of this study conclude that Korean ODA has generally been ()f 
poor quality and aliocated en an ad hoc basis. Their final chapter points to 
future directions for Korea's ODA program and policies, includingthe fi­
portanceofassistance on environmental and population control issues. 
Nicolas Ardito-Barletta 
General Director 
International Center for Economic Growh 
Panama City, Panama 
September 1992 
I KOREA'S DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 
ONE
 
Introduction
 
Korea was a major recipient ,fdde\velopment aid illhe I950s and I 960s. 
In the 1970s and I 980s, Korea was bolh a iecivient anddonorofaid. In the 
I990s, Korea is expected to become a niajor donor country. The first 
Korean concessionary loan was disbursed in 1989, and in April 199 1, a 
newagency specializing in forcign aid management began its work. The 
admission of Korea to the United Nations in Septeniber 199 1 is sure to 
raise the public's interest in Korea's development aid to other countries. 
The main purpose of this research is to review the performance of 
Korea's official development assistance (ODA) program and to discuss 
major policy issues of ODA that Korea can expect to face in the I990s. The 
timingofthis research is perfect considering the recent changes in Korea's 
position in the world economic community. But the lack of previous 
studies on this subject poses a great difficulty for an intensive research. 
Only recently have research works on this topic been available in Koiea. In 
order to understand clearly the issues that Korea must deal wNith in the pro­
cess of increasing ODA, we also had to study the policies and experiences 
ofdeveloped donor coun:rics. 
The remainder of this paper is divided into five sections. Chapter 2 
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discusses the current international environment for economic develop­
ment and examines the OD Aprograms of otherdeveloped and developing 
countries. The third chapter reviews Korea's experience as a recipient of 
ODA and argues the case for Korea's active participation in aid-giving. 
Chepter 4 deals with the performance of Korea's ODA. Detailed data on 
different types of Korean aid are provided and evaluated. The quality of 
Korean aid is al,,o examined and is compared %%ithaid from the developed 
countries. The general ideas that Korean policyniakers and the public have 
about Korea's aid policies and the organization of aid administration are 
the subjects of Chapter 5.The last chapterdeals with directions forKorea's 
ODA in the 1990s including the major policy issues concerning the vol­
ume, quality, and sectoraland geographic allocation of Korean aid. 
3 KODREAS DEVLLOPMENT ASSISTANCE 
TWO 
Developing Countries and Development

Assistance in Today's World
 
The Recent International Environment 
While the primary responsibility for the growth of the developing 
countries rests with the developing Countries themselves, a favorable in­
ternational economic environment can enhance the effectiveness of the 
development policies ofdevelonng countries. The internalional en viron­
merit is basically determined by (1) the market conditions for exports and 
imports of developing countries, and (2) the volume and terms of capital 
flows from developed to developing countries. In recent years, neither 
exports of no: capital inflom~s into developing countries have progressed 
at any significant rate. 
The liberalization of world trade in manufactures through multilateral 
negotiations and the generalized system of preferences granted by many 
developed countries contributed to the growth of'manufactured exports of 
developing countries in the I960s and I970s. However, the upsurge of 
inontariff barriers in developed countries in the late I 970s and 1980s has 
deterred the -::ports of manufactured products of developing countries 
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from bccoming an engine ofgro.vth. 
Primary goods exports typically make up a significant share of the 
exports of developing countries. However, international commodity 
agreements, despite prolonged discussions, have not succeeded in reduc­
ing the extent of instability of primary goods exports. The Common Fund 
is still not operational. 
Thus, as the world economy siowed down during the early 1980s, 
gro~vlh of developing countries' exports fell. The revival of world de­
mand after 1985 had only a small effect on the exports of developing 
countries, except for the East Asian nations. In contrast, Latin 
America's exports (in real terms) have only recently regained the level 
of the early 1970s. Sub-Saharan Africa's exports fell in the early I980s 
anti stagnated through 1988 (Woild Bank 1990:13). 
Net private capital flows to developing countries, which are mainly 
comprised of international bank lending and direct investmenCt, declined 
continuouslyduringthe period 1981 - 1986. Commercial bank lendingto 
developing countries increased sharply in the I970s and early 1980s. But 
the threat of default stopped most voluntary lending to the principal 
debtui safter 1983 (seelTable 2.1 ). Most ofthe loans todebtors were used to 
ro!l over existing debt. The burden : developing countries increased be­
cause real interest rates were exceptionally high during the I980s. Onl av­
erage, real interest rates in the 1980s were more than twice as high as the 
interest rates of the I960s (World Bank 1990:15). 
Although many detel, ingcount ries undertook policy reforms in order 
to induce more foreign direct investment (FDI), capital inflows to 
developing countries in the form of direct investment di I not increase. 
While the nominal value of direct investment in developing countries 
increased It0percent a year between 1967 and 1982, its real value hardly 
incr( -isedat all. Moreover, during 1983 - 1986, annual nominal values 
of FDI were less than that of 1982. A problem with direct investment in 
dev'loping countries is that it has been concentrated for the most part in 
a fewhigher-income countries and has therefore provided very little 
capital to the low-income countries. 
The size of total private resource flows to developing countries includ­
ing direct investment, international bank lending, bond lending, and 
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grants by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) decreased during the 
1980s. The value of private flows was $74.3 billion in 198 1, but only $40. 
2 billion in 1989 (see rable2. I). 
Table 2.1 Total Private Resource Flows to Developing 
Countries (US$ billion) 
Type of
 
Resourcefow 
 1981 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
 
Direct investment 17.2 12.8 11.39.3 6.6 11.3 21.0 25.1 22.0
 
lnt'lbank!ending, 52.3 
37.9 35.0 17.2 15.2 7.0 7.0 5.3 8.0
 
Totalbondlending 1.3 4.8 1.0 0.3 5.4 2.7 0.5 0.4 1.0 
Otherprivate 1.5 0.3 1.30.4 0.3 3.9 2.5 4.9 5.0
 
GrantsbyNGOs 2.0 2.3 2.9
2.3 2.6 3.3 3.5 4.2 4.2
 
Total 74.3 58.2 47.9 31.7 31.4 28.2 34.5 40.4 40.2 
Note :,a.Includes lending from allresources, i.e., including East in European 
countries and I DC donors, but excluding Taiwan. 
Source: OECD (1990), p.200. 
Weak external demand, declining terns of trade, and a diminishing 
supply of external finance combined to produce an unusually adverse 
economic environment fordeveloping countries in the 1980s. As Table 2. 
2 shows, per capita GDP fell in both Sub-Saharan Africa and Litin 
America during the I 980s. Except fortihecontries of EastaId SouLth Asia, 
economic performance of developing countries in the 1980s Wvas much 
iorsethan their performaIce inthe 1960sand 1970s. 
The development experience of the past shows that lhe grovsth of
 
developing countries is influenced considerably by the provision of exter­
nal capital from and the growth ofthe developed countries. In particular, 
the capital flows should be on terms and conditions which do not aggra­
vate the debt-servicing hurde 1 of the developing countries. The experi­
ence of the 1970,; and i 980s clearly shows that heavy reliance on private 
commercial banks for the necessary external finance cannot work for 
most developing countries. Rather, a substantial transfer of capital from 
developed to developing countries in the form of foreign aid is required for 
the l)romotion of development in poor countries. 
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Table 2.2 Growth of Real Per Capita GDP
 
in Developing Refions (percentage)
 
Region 1965-73 1973-80 1980-89 
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.2 0,1 -2.2
 
Eastern Europe 4.8 5.3 0.8
 
Middle East, North Africa 5.5 2.1 0.8
 
and other Europe 
Latin Americaand 3.7 2.6 -0.6 
the Caribbean
 
East Asia 5.1 4.7 6.7
 
South Asia 1.2 1.7 3.2
 
Source: World Bank( 1990),Table 1.2. 
Foreign Aid and Economic Development:A Historical Perspective 
ihe importance of foreign aid in the growth and stability of tile 
developing countries was clearly recognized by the developed countries 
after World War 11. Official commitment by tile Unied States to assist in 
the development of poorcountries was first made by President Trman in 
1949 (Kruegeret al. 1989:1). In his inaugural address, President Truman 
proposed that tile United States commit itself to "a bold newprogrami for 
making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress 
available for ihe improvement and growh ol underdeveloped areas." The 
United Kingdom and other developed countries of the British Common­
wealth signed the Colombo Plan in 1950. The plan began as a program of 
technical assistance for former British colonies in Asia, butother Asian re­
cipient nations were included later when the United States and Japan 
joined the plan. 
In the 1950s. the United States vas the dominant sourceof development 
assistance. During 1950- 1955, the United States alone accounted for 
alxu, one-haif of the world's total development assistance, whfile France 
accounted for about 30 percent and the United Kingdomn for over 10 
percent. During that period, the total world volume of development assist­
ance amounted to $7,897 million (in 1983 prices) with the United States 
supplying $3,961 million (OECD 1985.92 - 3). 
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Although Gernianyand Japan joined the aid donor group in the 1950s, 
it was not until the early I960s that comprehensive development assist­
ance programs of the two Countries occurred. Japan's reparations 
programs to Southeast Asian countries were accompanied by an ex­
panding governmient-to-gov'ernii lent loan program. 
The I 960s was a period ofgreat optimism about the possibilities ofde­
velopment. It o"as ixidelyaccepted that large incrementsof concessionary
aid directed towards supporling comprehensive development plans
would result in the self-sustaining growAIth of the developing countries. 
Thus the earl, I960s wasa period of extraordinary activity in the field of 
international cooperation. Jn 1961 the United Nations t)roclaimed the 
I960s as the "Developnent raecade." The OFEC (Organisation for Eur­
opean Economic Co-operation), the organization coordinating the 
Marshall Plan, was converted into the OECD (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Ievelopment). In 1960 the Development Assistance Group(DAG) wis created by established do)nors (the United States, France, the 
United Kingdom, the Nctherlands, Belgium, and Portugal) and new 
donors (Germany, Japan, Italy, and Canada). The name of the DAG was 
laterchanged to lhe De clopment AssistanceCon-ittee (DAC) in 1961.
 
.Alth()ugh the I960s 
was a decade of rapid gromih of the developing 
countries, development assistance from the developed countries did not 
increase during this period. This lack of growth in aid was the result of a 
majordecline in both U.S. and French aid from exceptionally high levels,

xitich was offset to some extent by substantial increases in .'conomic aid
 
from virtuallyall of tie otIter DAC countries. Bytheearly I970s, Germany

and Japan had become major contrihutors to the in'ernational assistance
 
effort. 
Aid from the Nordic countries and the Netherlands also expanded 
very rapidly it: the I960s. In the 10-year period between 1960/61 and
 
1970/71, the ODA/GNP ratio in Sweden increased from 0.06 percent to
 
percent and in the Netherlands,
0.41 the ratio rose from 0.38 percent to 
0.60percent (OECD I985:Table 3. ). 
If the I960s was the period for the laying of the modern foundations of 
aid, the I970s was the period of greater realism with regard to both the 
need for, and the results of, aid (Browne 1990:2 7). For many countries, 
funds from external sources for investment were iisufficient in quantity 
8 
and the investments that were made in productive capacity were inade­
quate for indigenous technicil know-how. Unlike the Marshall Plan, 
which proved the efficacy of substantial transfers of capital from stronger 
to weaker economies to the mutual benefit of both, the provisiol of assist­
ance to the developing count ies by the industrialized countries was not 
able to promote substantial development in recipient countries except in a 
few cases. 
The stagnation of aid gromvth and the energy and food crises in tihe early 
1970s, on top of the frustration of many developing countries with the pre­
vailing international economic order, led the Third World coUntries in 1973 to 
declare that the second development decade had failed and to call fora special 
session of the UN General Assembly. In 1974 the United Nations adopted a 
program for the establishment of a "New International Economic Order" 
(NIEO). Since then the North-South dialogue continued to focus on the 
issuesof theN iEO, bat very littleconcrete progress has been made. 
During the I970s development assistance was critiized from both the 
right and the left. The right criticized the role of foreign aid in politicizing 
economic .ctivity in developing countries and in contributing to the ex­
pansion of the public sector. Critics argued that aid strengthened the con­
trolofthecentral planningand fi!,ancial institutions o\'er pr'vate,:ectorac­
tivity (Krueger et al. 1989:5). The conservative critics also argued that 
governments that were able to usccapital producti\'elycould easily borrow 
in private international markets as Nxe1l1 as resorttoaid. Co versely, where 
investors have 110 confidente in the domestic economic policies of a 
government, capital flees abroad. Therefore, if a country cannot develop 
without external gifts, it is unlikely to develop with them. Another criti­
cism is that aid, having a relatively lowfinancial cost, is more likely than 
private capital to be directed to projects of symbolic and prestigious sig­
nificance. 
The critics hom the left emphasized external constraints on develop­
ment and viewed development assistance as an imperialisl icconspiracy, 
i.e., as an instrument for exploiting "esources and people of developing 
countries. "They argued that the prin-ipal beneficiaries ofaid projects are 
) See Chapter It of Ridd.IL(1987) for details. 
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the wealthyand the costs of modemization are borne by tle poor. 
The various attacks on economic aid reflected the recipient countries' 
disappointment at their development performance. While economic 
theories of foreign aid in the I960s argued that aid as a tool of direct inter­
vention can help to accelerate a development process by filling critical 
gaps that were preventing further growtlh,? development of many 
developing countries in the 1970s was eitherinot occurring or was slowing 
dowi. The foreign exchange gap was widening and investment levels 
%wrenot rising. Increasingly, tile developing countries incurred large bal­
ance-o f-paymentsdeficitsand Third Worlddebt gresv. 
In spite of the disappointment and criticisms of'the role of foreign aid, 
most governments and academic observers belie'e that aid can playacen­
tral role in the development of many countries. The decreased supply of 
private resource flows in the 1980s made the concessionary resource 
flows fron developed countries all the more important for low-income 
count ries. 
A comprehensi ve study ofthe effecli vCeSS ofaid by the Task Force on 
Concessionary Flows, %%ihich was established in 1982 by the IMF and the 
World Bank and includes govemmental representatives from a diverse 
group ofdeveloped and developing countries, concluded that aid has been 
productive and helpful to development: without it, a number of countries 
would not have been able to graduate from the ranks oftpoor to mu iddle-in­
conic countries, alld tile countries that continue to be poor Would have 
been even poorer (Burki and Ayres 1986). While the case of the "Green 
Revolution" in South Asian agriculture ws'as used as an example of the 
spectacular success of aid, the Task Force recognized that in some 
situations foreign aid has been much less effective. In general, develop­
mnent assistance has had a better record in Asia than in Africa. Neverthe­
less, even in Sub-Saharan Africa \vhere much aid has been legitimately 
criticized for not fully achieving its intended objectives, aid has 
contributed significantly to the development of basic infrastructure. Ac­
2)The Chenery and Strout two-gap model is still regarded asthcc most substiantialcontri­
bution dealing with the theoretical case for aid at the macro-level. See Riddel (1987), 
1).92.
 
Table 2.3 	 Total Net Resource Eows to Developing Countries 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
 
Current US$ billion
 
1. Official 	Development Finance (ODF) 45.5 44.2 42.4 47.7 48.9 56.3 61.6 66.0 69.0 
Official Develol ment Assistance (ODA) 36.8 33.9 33.9 35.0 37.3 44.5 48.3 51.6 53.1 
of which: Bilateral disbursements 28.9 26.3 26.3 27.2 28.8 34.9 38.2 40.3 40.5 
Multilateral disbursements 7.9 7.6 7.6 7.8 8.5 9.6 10.1 11.3 12.6 
Other ODF 8.7 10.3 8.5 12.7 11.6 11.8 13.3 14.4 15.9 
2. 	 Export credits 17.6 13.7 4.6 6.2 4.0 -0.7 -2.6 -0.5 1.2 
3. 	Private flows 74.3 58.2 47.9 31.7 31.4 28.2 34.5 40.4 40.2 
Total net resource flows (1 +2+3) 137.4 116.1 94.9 85.6 84.3 83.8 93.5 105.9 110.4 
US$ billion at 1988 piices and exchange rates
 
Total net resource flows 
 201.9 174.5 143.0 131.7 128.3 103.4 100.3 105.9 111.5
 
Total Official Development Finance 66.8 66.4 63.9 -3.4 74.5 69.5 66.1 66.0 69.7 
Total ODA receipts from all sources 54.1 51.0 51.1 53.8 56.8 54.9 51.8 51.6 53.6 
Total DAC ODA (bilateral and multilateral) 37.6 41.8 41.6 44.2 44.8 45.3 44.6 48.1 47.4 
Note: a. Excludes Taiwa n. 
Source:OECD (1990), p.123. 
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cording to the Task Force report, the laudable record of aid includes 
contributions to raising food production in South Asia, rural education 
in Africa, infrastructural investment to self-help rural develo.nment 
schemes, strengthening the deeloping cotntry's institutions, population 
programs, and initiatives to pronote policy reforms in developing co­
untries (Cassen 1986). 
Development Assistance from Developed Countries 
During the I980s, developing countries experienced declines in total 
net resource flows. As can be seen in Table 2.3, total net resource flows in 
real terms i:clined continuously during 1981 - 1987 and the value of 
total net flow in 1989 was just slightly higher than that of 1988. 
lotal net resource flows consist of three parts: official development 
finance (ODF), %%ichincludes official development assistance (ODA) as 
well as less-concessionrary multilateral flow and certain bilateral flows; 
total export credits; and private flo'., 
Since 1981 ODA floi%% have stagnated in real terms. But due tothe sharp 
fall in export credits and private bank lending follo%,ing the debt crisis in 
1982, the OD,. share of rotal net resource flows increased from 27 percent 
in 1981 to44 percew in 1985and48percent in 1989. 
This increased share ofODA in total net resource flows clearly indicates 
the importance of foreign aid in tie developing countries of today's world. 
lo0w-income countries have extrenely limited access to non concessionary 
flows and depend heavily upon ODA. For tile least developed countries, 
ODA in 1986 accounted for86 percent of their total net capital flow ixile 
the ratio was 39 percent for upper middle-inconie countries (Kruegeret al. 
1989:38-9). The importance of ODA to dev'eloping countries may be 
indicated by the ODA/GNP ratios of recipients. For Sub-Saharan African 
countries, the ODA receipt/GNP ratio amounted to II percent in 1988/89 
whfile it was I percent for Asian coutries. 
While total ODA receipts of developing countries in 1988 were $51.6 
billion, the total ODA from DAC countries in that year was $48.1 billion; 
thus the ratio of DAC ODA to total ODA receipts by de\'eloping countries 
12 
ODA from DAC Countries, 1988-1989(USSmilflon)Table 2.4 
A. Bilateral Official Development Assistance (1 + 2) 
1. Grants and grant-like contributions 

Technical assistance 

Food aid 

Administrative costs 

Other grants 
2. 	Development lending and capital 

New development lending 

Food aid loans 

Equities and othei bilateral assets 

B.Contributionsto MultilaterallInstitutions(I+2+3) 
I. 	Grants 

UN agencies 

EC 

Other 

2. 	 Capital subscription payments 

IBRD (including IFC) 

IDA 

Regional development banks 

Other 

3. Concessional lending 
Total (A+B) 

Source: OECD (1990), Tdblcs 51 and 52.
 
was 93 percent." In 1989 the ratio was 88 percent. 
1988 1989 
33, 156 34, 197 
26,010 2",266 
10.070 10,259 
1,827 1,575 
1,611 1,823 
12,502 13,609 
7,146 6,930 
6,746 7,349 
648 510 
-248 -929 
14,958 12,483 
6,703 6,705 
3,469 3,405 
2,569 2,636 
665 665 
8,272 5,792 
720 469 
5,293 3,252 
2,134 1,927 
126 144 
- 16 - 14 
48,114 46,679 
As shownii in Table 2.4, net disbursements of ODA from DAC countries 
to developing countries and multilateral organizations were $48.1 billion 
in 1988 and $46.7 billion in 1989. Allowing for changes in prices and 
terms 	decreased by 1.6exchange rates, this implies that ODA in real 
percent in 1989. The ratio of ODA toGNP of DAC countries also declined 
3) DAC members presently consist t. 18 developcd countries: Australia. Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland. France, Germany, Ireland. Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, NewZealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. 
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from 0.36 in 1988 to 0.33 in 1989; the average percentage during 
1980- 1985 was 0.36. The share ofbilateral ODA was 69 percent in 1988 
and 73 percent in 1989; the average during 1980- 1985 was 69 percent. 
More than 70 percent of bilateral ODA from DAC countries are given as 
grants orgrant-like contribut ions. 
Among the 18 DAC countries, the United States and Japan are the two 
largest donors ofODA. These two countries provided 36 percent of the total 
ODA by DAC countries in 1989. Although the United Staics was the largest 
donor up until 1988, in 1989 it was surpassed by Japan. Table 2.5 lists 
other major donors in recent years; they are France, Germany, Italy, the 
United Kingdom, Canada, and the Netherlands. Each of these countries 
offered more than $2 billion a year in development assistance. 
Table 2.5 ODA Performance of Individual DAC Countries 
volIumIIe As a share of' Annul~alaverage%
Country (US$million) GNP(,) - change involume 
_ 1988 1989 1988 1989 1983/84-1988/89 
Australia 1,101 1,020 0.46' 0.381 1.6
 
Austria 301 283 0.24! 0.23 0.0
 
Belgium 601 0.41
703: 0.46i 
-3.4 
Canada 2,347 2,3201 0.50, C.44 4.1
 
Denmark 
 922 937; 0.89' 0.941 4.6 
Finland 608 
 706! 0.59, .63 16.9
 
France" 6,865; 7,449 
 0.72: 0.78 3.0
 
Germany 1 4,731 4,949' 0.39 0.41 

-0.3
 
Ireland 
 571 491 0.20 0.17 0.4
 
Italy 3,193i 3,613 0.39: 0.421 14.8
 
Japan 9,134! 8,949 0.32: 0.32 3.6
 
Netherlands 2,231 2,094 0.98' 
0.94 2.4
 
Nei Zealand 104! 87' 0.27 0.221 
-1.4
 
Norway 
 9851 917 1.13' 1.04! 4.3
 
Sweden 1,534 1,799! 0.861 0.97' 4.9
 
Switzerland 617 558 0.32! 
 0.30 3.1
 
UnitedKingdonl 2,6451 587
2 0.32, 0.31 1.1
 
UnitedStates 10,141 7,659 0.15
0.21 
-2.0 
Total 148, 114146,679J 0 36, 0.33 2.2 
Notes :a. At 1988exchange ratesand prices. 
b. Includes flows to overseas depanments ani territories. 
Source : OECD(1990),p. 188. 
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Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands stand out as the 
countri's with the highest ODA/GNP ratios, with Norway in the lead at a 
higher than 1.0 percent level. Countries with tile lomwst ratios in 1989 were 
the United States. Ireland, NewZealand, and Austria. Finland and Italyare 
the two ountries which have sho i the most rapid growth of'ODA among 
the DAC members. Over the period 1983/84 - 1988/89, the annual 
groNth ofODA in real term ; w;'as 16.9 percent forFinland and 14.8 percent 
for Italy. For five countries-Belgium, Germany, Ireland, New Zealand, 
and the United State; - tie gro mth rates werv negative. 
The current ODA levels of the DAC members are contrasted with tie re­
commendation of the Pearson Report in 1969 that, by 1980 at the latest, 
every developed country should attain an ODA/GNP ratio of 0.7 percent 
(Pearson 1969: Chap. 7). Denmnark, the Netherlands, Norway, and 
Sweden are the only countries xitose ODA performance was consistently 
higher than the recomnmended rate. However, these countries are small in 
terms of GNPand theirtotal ODA in 1989 wasjust $5.7 billion, less than 13 
percent of the ODA by all DAC members. 
Development Assistance from non-DAC Countries") 
ODA from non-DAC countries in 1988 was $7.8 billion. The USSRand 
Saudi Arabia were the largest non-DAC aid suppliers, accounting for 80 
percentofall non-DACaid in 1988 (OECD 1990:Table 20). 
Non-DAC ODA has fluctuated considerably over the years due to 
fluctuations of ODA from the OPEC countries. During the period 
1975 - 1981, the volume of ODA from Arab donors was more than 30 
,)ercent of the total ODA from DAC countries. But in 1988, the ratio was 
less than 5percent, rellectingthe close relationshipbet ween oil pricesand 
aid from Arabcountries. 
The USSR provided $4.2 billion of ODA in 1988. The East European 
countries- mainly the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia. 
and Bulgaria-provided about $0.5 billion in net aid to developing 
4) Note that the defin ition ofaid by socialist countries may include fonis of economic 
cooperation which falloutsid iheDAC definition of ODA. 
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countries. The aid from these socialist Countries was concentrated in 
socialist developing countries inctding Cuba, Mongolia, Vietnam,
Afghanistan, and North Korea. Among the other developing Countries, 
India was by far the largest recipient of So\'iet aid. " 
Other non-DAC donors include non-DAC OECD countries and solme 
LDC donors. Spain, Portugal, Greece, Lutxembourg, and Iceland belong to 
the former group. Their total ODA in 1988 was less than $0.4 billion. 
Among the LDC!,, China and India were the two largest donors in 1988, 
providingp $128 million ind $82 million, respect i rely. It should be noted
that China and India are two of!he least de veloped coutntries in the world; 
yet they provide developtni.nt assistance to otherdeveloping countries. At 
the same time, theODA receipts of China and India are more than ten times 
their developmcnt assistance to others. In fact, China and India were the 
two largest recipients of ODA from DAC countries, receiving $1,973 
million and $2,099 million, respectively, in 1988. Venezuela, Korea,
Taiwan, Israel, Nigeria, and Yutgoslav'ia are other LDCs that provided 
ODAtodevelopingcountriesanldi multilateralagencies in 1988. 
5) It is somewhat ironic that the USSR, whose economy has experienced severe
shortages ofbasic goods in recent years, was the fifth largest ODA donorin 1988 after
the Unitde States, Japan, France, and Germany. By 1991, 'inually all aid flows fromthe USSR had stopped, and today many of'the former Soviet repubilcs are eager to re­
ceive aid and commercial loans from the West. Thenewly independent nationsofthe
former Soviet Union are to receive S3 billion in loans from Korea over the 1991 -
1993 period, mainly for relief of consunmer goods shortages. 
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THREE 
Korea and Foreign Aid 
Korea as a Recipient of Foreign Aid 
In the 1950s and I960s, Korea was a principal recipient ofOD A from 
developed countries. Economic assistance began in 1945 when Korea 
was liberated from Japanese rule and the American military govern­
- 1953)ment was established in South Korea. The Korean War (1950 
South Korea had fev naturalhad devastated the Korean economy. 

resources and a small manufacturing capacity at the time of the divi­
sion of tihe Korean peninsula. Afterthe war, the economy suffered from
 
shortages of all essential materials for consLmPtion and investiment.
 
Moreover, Korea was not able to obtain f'orcign resource flows from the 
private international capital market because no private lender 
regarded Korea as being creditworthy. At that time, exports could 
finance only a small fraction of imports."' As shown in TFable 3. , theav'­
erage foreign aidAniports ;atio was 7 1 percent during the period 1953 
6) In each yearduring the period 1954 -- '60, exportsamounted to less than IOpercent 
of imports. 
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-1962 .7 Aid received amounted to 8 percent of* GNP and almost 80 
percent of the total investment during those ten years (Mason et al. 
198 1:204). 
Table. 3.1 Foreign Aid Received andCommodity 
Importsduring1953 - 63 
Year Foreign Aid 
(USsmillion) 
Imports 
(USSmillion) 
Ratio of Foreign 
Aid to ltmxrts(%) 
1953 194.2 345.4 56.2 
1954 153.9 243.3 63.3 
1955 236.7 341.4 69.3 
1956 326.7 386.1 84.6 
1957 382.9 442.2 86.6 
1958 321.3 378.2 85.0 
1959 222.2 303.8 73.1 
1960 245.4 343.5 71.4 
1961 199.2 316.1 63.0 
1962 239.3 421.8 56.7 
1963 216.4 560.3 38.6 
Source : Bank ol'Korea (1 982). 
Under these circumistances, it is almost unimaginable to expect that Korea 
could ha%-c mlintained political orvconornic stability \vithout ecoomic aid. 
Postw ir reconstructioin had t( dectend heaily on resources from the United 
States. That Korea Wis one ()fthe tna,jor ICtipicnts of ODA in the 195Os and 
1960s is also c'ideit rom intcrmational comparisois. For instance, in 
1960 - 1961 Korea's aid receipts wcre 4.5 percent oflhe total ODA from DAC 
Cotritrics. Only three countries-h-india, Algeria, and Pakistan 
-Leceived 
moreaid ilhar Korea durilg this period (OECD1985:123). 
During the I950s anid early I960s, the United States was Korea's major 
7)The aid attounts in 1',;1t13.1 inctud akt trm the United Nations as wel as the United 
States. The UN sources w the Civil Rel iefin Ktea (CR IK)and Itie trtilled NationsKorea Reconst nction Agency (UNKRA). tlowever, since most of these UNin itiltliollswevoe fiInla ced by te Unitcd States. thte Uilited Statis was sirtually the 
only donor of aid ioKorea until the early 1960s. 
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source of foreign aid. However, after 1963, U.S. economic aid to Korea 
declined sharply. But other donors were added in the I960s. The World Bank 
made its first loan to Korea in 1962 and formed the Consultative Group for 
Korea in 1966 as a forum for aid coordination for Korea's development. " 
Japan became a new donor for Korea in 1965 after normalization of 
' Korea's diplomatic relations with Jipan. The Asian Development Lank 
became a doino in 1968. 
In the I980s bilateral ODA from Japan continued to flow into Korea, 
mainly in tihe form of concessiona ry loans for infirasi ructtihe prjcts. InI 
1980/81, as in 1970/7 1,Koica ranked second after Indonesia on the list of 
Japan's ODA recipients. But by 1988/89, Korea ranked I6th Nvilh con­
cessionary loans amounting to 27.3 billion y'en inlthe 1988 fiscal year and 
7.6billionyCnduring April- December 1989 (MITI 19,s0:182 -8). 
Korea was eliminated Irom the list of Japani's QECF recipients in 1990as 
a resulit of the a pid growth illKorean per capita income. The I1BRD is cur­
rent ly the only source of conce:s ionar\ loans for Korea."" 
Korea as a Donor 
Tile number of donors of economic aid in the world has increased over 
the years. Illthe I960s, DAC countries w\ere Virtually the only sources of 
OLA front non-Communist countries. During the 1970s and 1980s, 
non-DACOECI) members, Araboil exporlers, and some LDCs became new 
donors. As shomvn earlier, the volume of aid from LDC donors remained 
small compared to aid from the Arab countries, the USSR, or the East 
European count ries. Nevertheless, an importa it point is that a donor 
8)1lieCionstltati veGrioupwasdissol cd in 1984. 
9)The noirmalization pact included 102 bill on yen in gr.ints over 10 years 
(1965- 1975) isKorea's claim to Japan For the damages incurred while Korea was 
tnder Japanese colonial rule. Other granits and concessionl loans from Japan he­
ganin 1971. 
10)Since 10i62 Korea has received mnore than S7billioii oflconcessionary Ilans fhoni the 
ecotontic dailyl 199 t).towever, the United States :ind sev­
eral other developed countrieC: have recently been urging the IBRD to discon­
tinue providing concessionary loans to Korea because of its high inlcolmte le'el. 
IBRD (,\la'i/K igl rh['Fh 
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country is not necessarily a rich country. As in the caseof China and India, 
a country can be a donore\'en if it is very poorand receives a large amount of 
foreign aid every year. 
The tnotives for foreign aid range from the pure huManitarian diesire to 
reduce poverty to the political and commercial interests o, suppliers. 
Foreign aid can enhance in vestment and growl h in developing countries 
and increase global output and efficiency. Ill this process, developing 
countries' demand for imports also increases. Inl addition, ifdev'elopilg 
countries are succeeding in their developrnent efforts which are fina,,cedt 
partly through foreign aid, they can be expected totcontrol communicable 
diseases, avoid envirenmental disasters, and generate jobs at home, an-d 
thenby rc(Lce illegal imItnigration torich countries (Gulhali and Nallari 
1988:1 173). Therefore, f0m eign aid canl benefit both the donor and the re­
cipi-nt country. 
The same motives for foreign aid and the same understanding oft he 
ro!vs of foreign ai( that are applied by rich countries canl also beapplied 
to a Iniddle-incole couIntry like Korea. Only the capacity to tralsfer 
resources anid the piubIc su pporit for tile transfer differ a mong 
CoUIutries. Many Koreans are 'ell a wsare that Korea received a substan­
tial amount of foreign aid inl the earlier years and that the aid 
cont ri buted signi fi,:a to the rapid growdli of the Ko rean econom y. '"nt l1'
They also know that the development ass:,stance given to Korea 
berefitted the don(or countr'ies as wellIthrugh tlie expa ns ion of'Korean 
tlmand f'oriinlports of goois and ser\'ice:.. Morto\'er, th'st benlefits to 
doniors continuei long after thetermination of theaid. 
According to the WoItI Bank, Korea's per capita GNP in 1988 wa; $3, 
600; there were 88 cout.[ties with low\'-er incomenlevels (thisdid not include 
tile po)1 countries svidl populations of less than I million and the poor 
nonreport ing socialist countries). Among the 88 cotuntries, 42 countries 
hw 
Contrasting view \w'hicltthat aid impedes development and that [le absence of 
11) Korea's deloe ntI performance, howev 'er, isalso Cited as e'idtnce of a
 
says I 
aid istieSreSt Walyoadvance.Proponentsofihis viewt)inll totle f-act
that Korea's
 
tconom icgrowh in 1the954 ­ 1960 period,when Korea recti vedalargeranlountof
 
aid, was minimal comnpared wit h i he perfomance ofl le posl- 1961 period ;wt'hn aid
 
flowsd'creas'd (Riddell 1987:249)
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had per capita incomes of $545 or less. This gap between tie incomes of 
Korea aid tie r)ooierd veloping countries is sufficient to call loreflfois by 
Korea to provide development assistance to poor countries. Helping poor 
countries is not the responsibility of highlyde'elhpedC(,untries aloe. 
As mentioned above, economic aid eVelltually benel'its all countries, if 
the aid is used properly. In this case a country can bea "f'ree-rider" that does 
not provide aid but receives benefits induced by the aid gi xei b'yot he s. But 
there are solle important direct benefits that only donorcountries can el­
joy. These benefits may be divided into twvo categories: economic benefits 
and political benefits. 
The most obvious of economic gains to donors are those xvhicl: accrue 
fiom exports of commodit ies or services that arc made possible by the as­
sistance program. For instance, producers o!'food beie filfrom food assist­
ancc and engineering firms gain from contracts associated with infrastruc­
lre develop lln project,. Aid also plays the role of strengthening com­
mercial ties bet\ween the donor and the recipient. Commercial contacts 
made during a period of assistance can be expected to continue into the ft­
ture. Ifa developing couint ry receives assistance fort he development of its 
communiilicat ion netw\ork. firtlore delnalnd for newvalid replacement equip­
ieit compatible wxith the aid-assisted i,,vesiment will increase the 
dollOr's sales opportunities. Ifaid promotes economic gro\th orallexiates 
ecCoomic difficulties in a dexelopihg count1y in wh ich t lie donor has sub­
stantial overseas invest meit, then tbe aid benefits tihe donor by ensuring 
continued profi abil ityo!'the forei gn in v-estnIent. 
Of'cotirse, tlie v'alue of a given level olassistance to the reci pient country 
is reduced if the door uses the ass'stance resources 1o Stipport dolllestic 
suppliers of'comnloditics anid services or overseas investnient. Yet mally 
donor go'erniients have indicated that their (-.%il national economic 
interests are, in fact, considered inidecisions oin aid allocations. Empirical 
studies of major donorcottries' bilateral a d haVe fotuid thbat the donors' 
interests provided good exllaliations of the aid allocation. '-, 
Dl.xelopment assistance is lFeneficial to the donor country because it 
iso strengthens lhe political comnitment oltheaid recipient tothedonor. 
12)Oiiee:..anple isthestudy by Maizelsa.nd Nissanke (1984) 
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Political interest and strategic conct.rns were prominent motives for the 
Marshall Plan and the Kennedy Administration's "Alliance for Progress" 
program (Ruttan 198). If Korean ai - to developing countries can bring 
increased political support of the rf'cipients and enhance national security 
in Korea, the case for Korea's ODA is strengthened. The continuing con­
frontation with socialist North Korea makes this political interest more im­
portant for Korea than formany otherdonorcou ntries.
 
For a middle-income country like Korea, 
which is newly joining tile 
group of dono:-s, the economic and political benefits that can be accrued 
from providing foreign aid are imrportant and should be stressed to gain 
public support for aid-gi'ing. However, it must be emphasized at this 
point that the donor's self-interest must not be a primary rationale for de­
velopment assistance. If tie self-interest is pursued too far, the aid can 
even larm tie recipient couilntry. 
Korea as a donor is al)propriate in oday's world not only because the in­
ternational economic community needs additional donors, but because 
the Korean economy can now afford it. Active participation of upper 
middle-income countries in aid-giving is called fr as growth of world de­
velopment assistance has stagnated. In recent years, aid from DAC
 
countries has only grown at about 2 percent each yearin realterms, and it is 
not likely to groxvat a faster rate in tile near future (OECD 1989:155). Aid 
from Arab countries has declined continuously after 1986, and tile sag­
ging trend Will continle unless the price (; oil rises sharply in tile future 
Aid from tile former USSR is not expected to resuLe in tile near futtre, as 
the restructuring of the economy and tile economic difficulties that will 
emerge in the process will not allow tile new nations to allocate tile 
available scarce resources toaid. "' Note, however, that ifthe refornis in the 
socialist countries continue and the strains between the East and the West 
blocs are eased, then tile aid from the former USSR loses its rationale as 
much of the aid has been for tile purpose of garnering political support 
fronmotlersocialist countries. 
13) With the dissol tion of the USSR and subsequent events in the ne\w.ly independent 
nations, tlhe nations of the former So'iet Un ion are nowseeking aid rather than .1is­
bursing aid to othercountries. 
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Many Koreans believe that economic aid to other countries is proper 
only so long as Korea experiences surpluses in its current account. To the 
extent that economic aid is a form of transfer of resources to other 
countries, the aid will involve a deterioration of the donor's current ac­
count balance. However, as long as the aid is not in the form of an untied 
cash grant, the negative effect on the donor'. balance of pa1 ments may be 
negligible. Furthermore, as discu s' ed earlier, the long-ten neffect ofaid on 
the donor's balance of payments could be positive because ofincreased de­
mand for imports in recipient coinimies. 
Many countries have provided a significant V-lume of econonmic aid to 
others in spite of'theiroml large current account deficits. For instance, during 
1988 - 1989 all DAC countries (except Japan, Gennany, tile Netherlands, 
Switzerland, anC.Belgium) registered current account deficits; yet they pro­
%idedmore than $59 bilion of ODA in the tin) years. In particular, the six 
countries -Finland, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Canada - liose 
real ODA gromuh rates in the 1980s Nwre higher than that of any other DAC 
members, all showed deficits in their current accounts for most of the period. 
Thus, the current accounLt, orany other measure of balance ofpayments, is not 
a measure of the capacity to provide aid to others; it is simply a measure of a 
country's international transactions. 
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Performance and Quality of Korea's ODA 
Overview of Korea's Economic Cooperation with Developing 
Countries 
Up until the mid- 1970s, Korea's economic relations with developing 
countries were not close as most of its international trade was mainly 
with developed countries. From the early I960s when Korea adopted 
an outward-looking development strategy, its exports were mostly 
manufactured products that were mainly directed to developed 
countries, in particular, the United States and Japan.' The United 
States and Japan were the twodomniiant trade partners forKorean imports 
as well, accounting for7Opercentof Korea's total imports in 1970. 
Korean trade with developing countries began to increase after the first 
oil shock. The increased value of oil imports from the Middle East and 
increased demand for Korean exports by the oil-producing countries were 
the main causes of increased trade relations between Korea and developing 
14) The share of manufactured goc 's in exports rose from 50 percent in 1964 to 90 
percentin 1974 (S.Kim 1982:Table2.4). 
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countries after 1975 (see Table 4. ). Increased efforts by Korean exporters 
to diversify their export markets, induced by the surging protectionism in 
developed countries, also contributed to the increasing significance of 
developing countries for Korean export s. 
Table4.1 DeveloplngCountries' Share of Korean Tradea (percentage) 
11960 1970 1975 1980 1985 1989 1990 
Exports 11.3 12.7 20.0 31.7 29.9 26.2 30.7 
Imports 9.3 16.8 27.1 35.6 36.2 26.4 28.9 
Note: a. Developing countries rder to allnon-OECD countries including socialist 
coulntrit. s. 
Sources:MFA (1990); EPB (1990a, 1991a). 
The size of Korea's FDi abroad was very small Until the early 1980s. Dur­
ing the I960s and until the late 1970s, Korea wasa typical labor-abundant 
but capital-scarce country. The total net foreign direct investment from 
Korea during 1968- 1982 was only $290 million, and it was only in 1986 
that Korea's annual FDI level surpassed the S100 million level. As shown 
in Table 4.2, the share of Korean foreign direct in vesl nent inl de'eloping 
countries has been around 40 or 50 percent, wihich is much highert han the 
developing countries' share of Korea's commodity trade. Anong the 
developing countries, most of the Korean FDI is in the Asian countries 
such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand. 
Indonesia has been by far the most important destination country for 
Korean capital. Oftlle cuinulative net total FDI in dev'eloping countries at 
theend of 1990 (s 1.028 million), $425 millionor41 percent was ilvested 
in Indonesia. Malaysia and the Philippines are next Ivith cumularivetotals 
of $50 million and $38 million, respectiwely. Recently, direct investments 
in China and Sri Lanka have increased markedly. Among non-Asian 
developing countries, Panama, Guatemala, Papua New Guinea, Turkey, 
and Algeria are the countries that hosted most Korean foreign direct 
investments. About 48 percent, or $498 million, of' Korean FDI in 
developing countries is invested in manufacturing and 27 percent is in 
mining. 
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Table4.2 Korea's Foreign Direct Investment Abroad 
1968-1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
World(USsmillion) 
Developing Countries' 
(US$ million) 
Asa ShareofTotal 
FD] to World(%) 
626 
299 
41.4 
172 
85 
49.4 
397 
209 
52.6 
212 
91 
42.9 
493 
235 
47.7 
1,020 
375 
36.8 
Note: a. All non -OECD coutitries. 
Source: Bank of Korea statistics. 
Korea's relations %%ilhdeveloping coutrtries as a donorof development 
assistance began wery early. In 1963, the lKorean go\emment began tech­
nical cooperation by recei'ing trainfees from developing countries. How­
ev-er, the cost of this program was covered bythe USAID aid program. Ac­
ceptance of trainees funded by the Korean .,ovelrnment started in 1965 and 
the first dispatch ofexperts to developing counties by Korea was made in 
1967 (MF A 1990:37). Bilateral grant aid began in 1977 when the Min­
istry of Foreign Affairs provided 900 million won (S 1.66 million) for 
developing countries to purchase machines and equipment needed for 
development act i%,itics. 
File Korean development assistance program was greatly enhanced 
by the creation of the Economic Dev'elopment Cooperation Fund 
(EDCF) in 1987. The fund was established with the government sub­
scription of 30 billion won ($37.9 million) and was intended mainly 
for concessionary bilateral loans to dev'eloping countries. Currently 
Korea's ODA administration is being restructtured by the establishment of 
the Korea Intenlational Cooperation Agency (KOICA) in early 199 1. " 
Calls for a central aid agency like KOICA appealed to consistency ard ef­
ficiencyinaid policy. 
KOICA's major respoisibilities are to manage Korea's technical assis­
tanceand grant aid prograns which were hithertodealt with byse%'eraldif­
15) The law establishing KOICA was passed inJanuar, 1991 and the agency beganop­
erationin April 1991. 
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ferentgovernment ministries (seeTable 4.7). Anotherimportant function 
of KOICA is to implement the new Korean Youth Volunteers progran 
which sends qualified young Koreans todeveloping count ries to work with 
local people. In many ways, KOICA was modeled afterJiCA (Japan inter­
national Cooperation Agency) wiich was established in 1974. LikeJICA, 
KOICA is under the authority oft lhe Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The major 
functions ofJIC Aand KOICA are similar, even in their main non-aid func­
lion which is to assist in the emigration and overseas eimployment of their 
nationals. 
Contributions by Korea to multilateral instlittioiis, ',''hich include 
grants and capital sut)scriplions, have been greater in v'olume than Korean 
contributions to all bilateral ODAs combined. More than 90 percent of the 
multilateral assistance in the I980s was inthe form of'capital subscription 
payments to international or regional financial institutions such as the 
IMF, IBRD, IDA (International Development Association), and ADB 
(Asian Development Bank). But after peaking at S222 million in 1983, 
total contribut ionstomultlilateral institutions declined. 
Official flows offi nancial res(irces from Korea to developingcountries 
and multilateral agencies are showi in Table 4.3. The data show that 
Korean ODA is relatively small and fluctuates widely. Since 1988, the 
ODA./GNP ratio has been oniy 0.04 -0.05 percent, and over tile entire 
ten-year period, the ODA amotnt exceeded $100 Million in only three 
years. Furthermore, the relatively large amounts of ODA in these years 
were entirelh. due to the tin usually large capital subscriptions to iuiltilat­
eral financial institutions. Grant aid and technical assistance remained 
vcry small. The sum of grants and technical assistance surpassed the $20 
million level forthe first ti meonly in 1989. 
During the period 1981 -- 1990, theamoint of'total ODA in current dollar,; 
fluctuated bet %wena lowof'S20.9 million ( 193 I ) and a high of $233.7 million 
(1983). It did not show any trend of steady increase over the years. The 
f]Luctuat ions were dUetothe unstable variations in contributions to mlultilateral 
institutions. Grants and technical assistance, hoNvver, have shom trends of 
steady increase. The sum of these two types of expenditures increased 
from$5., million in 1981 toS20.7 million in 1990. 
Other official flows (OOF) from Korea todeveloping countries comprise 
Table4i.3 Total Official Flows from Korea to Developing Countries and Multilateral Agencies (US$ million) 
I. Oflicial Dewlopment Assistance (ODA) 
1.Grants 
2. Technical cooperation 
Students and trainees 
Dispatch of'experts 
Engineering service 
Others 
4 
.Contrilutionston LItilateralitzsIititions 
1981 
20.9 
4.0 
1.3 
15.6 
i982 
126.4 
4.1 
3.3 
119.0 
1983 
233.7 
6.9 
4.5 
1.7 
0.2 
-
2.6 
222.3 
1984 
28.0 
6.3 
6.1 
2.3 
0.2 
1.3 
2.3 
15.6 
985 
48.3 
8.9 
6.4 
2.4 
0.3 
1.? 
3.5 
33.4 
1986 
111.5 
8.5 
6.5 
2.2 
0.3 
.3 
2.7 
-a-
96.5 
1987 
74.7 
9.1 
8.2 
2.3 
0.6 
0.9 
4.4 
-
57.4 
1988 
62.3 
11.4 
8.5 
2.0 
0.7 
1.1 
3.8 
-
42.4 
1989 
98.5 
12.6 
8.5 
3.6 
0.7 
1.9 
2.3 
1.8 
76.6 
1990 a 
89.2 
11.6 
9.1 
3.4 
1.4 
1.8 
2.5 
9.956.8 
Subscript!onpaym h ents 
Grants 
l.OtherOfficialFlo.s(OOF) 
1.Officialexportcrc(ils 
2. Foreign inv'estientcredits 
ODA +OOF 
ODA/GNP(%, 
, 
11.9 
3.7 
308.8 
293.0 
15.8 
329.7 
0.03 
115.6 
3.4 
353.1 
331.0 
22.1 
479.5 
0.18 
218.2 
4.1 
363.5 
326.0 
36.5 
597.2 
0.31 
11.1 
4.5 
359.9 
352.4 
7.5 
387.9 
0.03 
28.5 
4.9 
368.0 
350.1 
17.9 
416.3 
0.05 
91.6 
4.9 
275.6 
261.4 
14.2 
387.1 
0.11 
51.6 
5.8 
346.5 
333.1 
13.4 
421.2 
0.06 
35.7 
6.7 
433.0 
403.9 
29.1 
495.3 
0.04 
66.9 
8.7 
304.8 
155.7 
149.1 
403.3 
0.05 
46.5 
10.3 
426.7 
212.9 
213.8 
515.9 
0.04 
z 
> 
Note:a.The total ODA amount includes aid ad ministrationi co':ts of S1.9 million, 
Source: EPB statistics. 
z 
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export credits and overseas investment cre' ts, both of %hichare supplied 
by the EXIM Bank of Korea. " ' As shown in Table 4.3, export credits 
accounted for more than 90 percent of OOF until 1988. Since much of the 
export credits were for exports of ships, the total export crcdits fluctuated 
along with the exports of the Korean shipbuilding industry. In the late 
I980s, the share of overseas investment credits increased substantially, 
reflecting the increased foreign direct investment by Korean firms in 
developing countries. 
Classifications of ODA 
Korea's classifiation of official development assistance differs from 
that used by thfie DAC. I'his difference in measurement is the maj orcause of 
the severe fluctuations in the Korean statistics ofOD Aand OD "NP ratios 
as shown in Table 4.3. The difference in defining and classifying ODA 
becomes clear if w, cc;m pare the Korean classi fication in Table 4.3 with the 
classification adopted by the DAC iniTable 2.4. 
Bilateral ODA in the DAC classification is divided intotwo types, while 
in the Korean ca!- 'it is divided into three types. The lifference is that in the 
Korean data, technical assistance and grants are treated as two separate 
types of GDA. In the Korean data, bilateral grants referto funds forthe pur­
chase '4materials, machines, and equipment, or for disaster relief. 
A more important difference is found in the treatment of multilateral 
ODA. In Korea, all capital subscriptions to international institutions and 
funos, inclUding the IMF, are counted as ODA. In contrast, the DAC does not 
count subscription payments to the IMFasODA, asthe IM Fis not regarded as 
an ilp1tatit Multilateral institution which provides concessionary flo%%s to 
developing countries. Only the disbursements undertheTrust Fund, the SAF 
(Structural Adjust ment Facility), and the ES AF (Enhanced Structural Adjust­
ment Facility) ofthe IMF are considered tobepart of ODA by DAC. 17, 
16) 	 The EXIM Bank wvasestablished in 1976. Belrethistiie, OlhEXIM Bankbusiness 
was handled by the Korea Exchange Bank. 
17) 	 See the Statistical Annex. Table 27 of OECD (1990) for a more detailed expla­
nation. 
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Yfsubscription payments to the IMF atc included in ODA, then Korea's 
contribution to international institutions in 1989 is negative because in 
thatyear Korea received 59,099 million won ($88.0 million) fronthe IMF 
as a result of'a readjustmlent in the value ofa previous capital subscription 
according to the won's appreciation. But in Korea's ODA statistics, this 
negative contribution was not taken into aCCOLnt. The reftnd from the re­
adjustment occurred in the case of the World Bank as well, but the amotnt 
was much smaller. "' 
For any activity or any flowof resoUrce to be called ODA, it must satisfy 
certain conditions. ODA is generally defined as all flows to developing 
countries and multilateral institutions provi(led byofficial agencies which 
meet the following tests: ( 1)they are administered with the promotion of 
economic development and welfare of developing countries as their main 
objective; and (2) their financial terms are intended t(. be concessionary in 
character, i.e., the monetary flowmust contain a grant element (GE) ofat 
least 25percent. 
The grant eiement is determined by the financial terms of'a transaction: 
the interest rate, maturity, and grace period. The grant element of a loan is 
the excess of the loan's face value overthe present valie ofeach repaymetl 
installment at the market rate of interest, expressed as a percentage of the 
face value. The market rate is usually taken as 10 percent. Thus the GE is 
nil fora loan carrying an interest rate of' 10 percent and it is 100 percent for 
an outright grant. Ifa loan's maturity is more than 10 years, with a grace 
period of 5years, then it will ha'e a GEof'over 25percent ifthe interest rate 
is not above 5percent. 
Korean Bilateral ODA 
As explained earlier, Korean bilateral ODA consists of three categories: 
grants, technical cooperation, and development loans. These three types 
ofaidarediscussed in furtherdetail in this section. 
18) 	 According to officials responsible for the government's ODA statistics, the sub­
scription payment tothe IMF will not be counted as part ofKorean ODA beginning 
with 1991 statistics. 
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Grants. In the past. bilareral grant aid has been implemented by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But beginning in April 199 1, Korean aid has 
been administered by KOICA under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
Bilateral grants are mainy intended to prolote diplomatic and com­
mercial relations %iithThird World countries. The grants are regarded as 
the assistance tool thmt can respond most effectiv'ely to the recipient's 
need. In princille, the grarn!s are for the purchase of'Korean machinery 
and equipment from Korean producers. Therefore, this aid is fully tied aid. 
In the sense that the grant aid is fully tied and that it is aimed at mainly ma­
chinery and equipment, the Korean grants are d ifferentiated from thoseof 
developed cotIntries. Of course, the procurement-tying reduces the real 
value of the grants to the recipient because it forces the recipient country to 
buy sLpplies at noncompetitive prices. Since many Korean policymakers 
think that the balance ofp,'m,'nt s isan im porta nt constraint tothe grom~1h 
ofgrant,:id, the aid tying may contribute to the increase oft he aid. 
Korean grant aid is a kind of'program aid, as distinct from project aid. A 
' program aid takes fle frm of general balance-of-paymlents support, 
while project aid, for construction of a chemical piont, for instance, 
reuluires more administrative resources of the donor and takes a longer 
time for decision making. Project aid would not be necessary on develop­
ment grounds if the donor wvas confident that both the preferences and 
capabilitivs of the recipient assured the best possible use ofall res(ources 
available. Therefore, an important question is the capacity of the donor 
country to assist in the process of project identification and execution if 
project aid is preferred by the donor (Economic Cormticil of Canada 
1978:93). At present, Korea's grant aid program lacks both the manpower 
and financial resources required for making project aid a major type of 
grantaid. 
Grant aid is initiated by a request to the Ministry (f Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) from the developing country through the Korean embassies and 
19) A fully untied program aid is a simple gift of money to be spent in any way the 
recipient chooses. 
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legations abroad. After securing its annumal budget "r grants, which isde­
termined prior to receipt of requests, the M F A evalhtates the requests and 
selects the Korean producers that vili supply the approved products. Cur­
rentlythese evalttiou anld selection tasksareC executed bythe KoryoTrade 
Co., a general trading compan y managed by the Korean government. After 
the approved prodtcts are contracted lot and produLced, they are inspected
and sent to the reci pient cOutlntINs. The shipping docutnients are sent tothe 
Korean embassies or legat ions in the recipient count ries. The inspect ion 
and transporting ol'the products and the preparation of the documents are 
all done bythe Kotyo Trade Co. 
fhe allocation of grants aniong deVelopitng countries by the M FA is
usuIally made on the basis of the previous year's allocation.2 Reflecting 
the Koreatn government's attempt to accommodate the 	request of any 
Table 4.4 Korea's GrantAidtoDevelopingCountrics, 
1977- 1990 (USS thousand) 
1977-1985 1986 1987 1988 
Asia 
MiddleEast 
Af'ria 
L 
LatminArerica 
Others 
Total 
1989 
6,394 2,118 1,935 2,406 2,605 
(15) (17) (21) (21)
2,655 464 869 1,127 1 ;28 
(5) (6) (27) (8) 
18,816 2,532 3,368 4,340 4,718 
(23) (24) (9) (30) 
10,331 3,381 2,928 3,569 3,506 
(26) (26) (27) (27)
42 
­ - - 607 
(3) 
1990 Total 
2,62W 18,078 
(19) 
992 7,235 
(8). 
3,738!37,512 
(29)1 
3,068I26,783 
(28) 
1,176 1,825 
(10) 
38,238 8,495 9,100 11,442 12,564 11,594! 91,433 
(69) (73) (84) (89) (94)1 
Notes: - = zeroor near zero. 
a. Nunber of coontries is indicated in parentheses. 
Source: MFA statistics. 
20) 	This 'incrementalism' ofaid decisions is widespread in developed countries too. 
Formore infornation, seeGulhatiand Nallari (1988),1).1177. 
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Third World country, the allocation pattern has been one in which a small 
amount of aid is granted to each of many countries. The trends in total 
annual v3lume and broad geo) raphical distribution of Korean giant aid are 
shown in Table 44." Inthe 14-year period since 1977, $91 million worth 
of grants have been given by Korea. In recent years the annual volume has 
been a little over $10 million. hd ividually, the size of grant aid to any one 
country has not been large. In 1990, for instance, $11.6 million of aid was 
allocated among 94 countries. Of these 94. only 12 countries received 
$200,000 or more of grant aid from Korea (Table 4.5). On the other hand, 
45 countrieseach received s 100,000orless. 
Table 4.5 Recipients of KoreanGrantAid$200,000 or 
More in 1990(US$ thousand) 
Country Anount Country Amount 
Bhutan 200.0 Surinam 274.5 
SriLanka 308.9 Senegal 281.8 
Philippines 226.0 Somalia 269.9 
Pakistan 247.8 Ethiopia 286.9 
Mongolia 448.0 Egypt 360.2 
Bolivia 202.8 Bulgaria 249.7 
Total 3,3 56.5 
Source: EPB( 199 Ia). 
Twenty-three countries each received more than $1 million in grants 
from Korea over the period 1977 - 1989 (Table 4.6). During this period, 
these countries together received a total of $39 million in grants, which is 
about one half of the total grants disbursed by Korea during the period. 
Although 14 of the 23 countries are African countries, only 9of the 23 are 
so-called LLDCs (Least Developed Countries) using the DAC classifi­
cation. Thus it is not correct to say thata major portion of Korean grant aid 
21) 	 Note. h,_mover. that the volumle ofaid in any given year is expressed in U.S. dollars 
andthusdepcndson tieaverage won/dollarexchangerate of that year. 
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,as directed to the poorest countries of the world. Rather, the allocation 
weas made mainly on the consideration of maintaining good diplomatic 
relations with more developingcountries. 
Table 4.6 	 Reciplents of Korean Grant Aid of $1Millionor 
More During 1977 - 89(US$ thousnad) 
I
 
Country Alounl Country Amount 
Burma 1,696 Sierra Leone 1,183 
Nepal 1,175 Cted'Iveire 1,289 
Pakistan 1,694 Uganda 1,100 
Sri Lanka 2,320 Ethiopia 3,965 
Sudan 1,5,8 Zaire 1,438 
Egypt 1,163 Central African Rep. 1,511 
Mauritania 1,243 Peru 2,688 
Ghana 1,412 Dominican Rep. 1,007 
Gabon 1,094 Costa Rica 1,660 
Guinea-Bissau 1,514 Panama 1,332 
Liberia 2,117 Bolivia 1,727i 
Senegal 2,897 
Total 	 38,778
 
Source: MFA statistics. 
This strong non-economic consideration in the allocation of the grant 
aid isnot unique to Korea. Empirical studies of'intercountry allocation of 
foreign aid by developed countries point out that political and trade 
variables are important factors determining grant aid for many countries 
and partlyas a result oflthis, manypoorcountries were neglected in foreign 
aid allocation. A study by Gulhati and Nallari (1988), which analyzed the 
intercountry allocation of foreign aid by 8 donors, found that major aid 
donors have uistinctive aid profiles. Pzlitical intercsts are important for 
the United States and the United Kingdom, but are of scarcely any signifi­
cance forthe Netherlands and Sweden. The trade factor is significant forJapan 
Table 4.7 Type, Volume, and Ministries Involved in Korea'sTechnicalAssistance Program, 1987- 1990 
1987 1988 1989 1990
 
Typeof Assistance and Ministry In\%olved Amntountu Aont :Amount Anlount 
Persons (USS Persons (USS Persons (US S Persons (USSthoudsand) thsanand Iiiotisaid(D thousand)
1. Trainees &sLudents 457 2,266 513 2,939 597 3,600 580 3,038
MinistryofScience&Tech. 285 1,041 339 1,593 352 2,090 393 1,763
Ministryof Foreitn Aftairs 53 286 o6 303 89 380 5 1 342
Ministryof Construction 42 344 48 410 
 51 447 35 353Ministry of Labor 23 266 26 327 40 307 36 206MinistryofCootniunications 4 64 4 81 28 341 51 342Mimstrx ofEdLcation 50 265 30 226 5 37 ­ -
Ministry ofGo" tAdministration 
. - - 30 - 14 31Ofticeo Fisheries [...-I11-
- ­2. Disl,,itchofExpcrts 51 618 60 682 83 739 13 1,444Ministryof'Sciencc.&Tech. 28 192 44 268 66 302 51 321Ministi y of'Forein Affairs 7 58 5 56 - - 3 55MinistryofLabor 1I 329 11 358 11 399 9 325Mini,-ry ofCoinitnications 1 19 - - 3 7 6 283 
MinistryofEducation 
­ -
- 3 3 I 44 461MinistryofEncrgvand Resources 4 19 - . . . . 
3. Engineering Scrxice 4* 898 7* 1,146 10* 1,878 9* 1,864Ministryof'Seincc&Tech. 1* 36 2* 52 2* 25Ministrv'ofCotnimnications 
. . . . 1" 274 1 487Ministr 'ofConstruct ion 3* 862 5* 1,095 5- 1.450 8* 1,376Economic Planningioard . . . .- 2* 128 - ­4. KDl's IDEP' 107 350 94 388 124 505 107 3055. Special Assistance 2,348 2,410 1,656 37 1,300(Tael,\vondoand Medicalassistance)
6. TrainingCenter (equipment) 1.362 878 31 1 247. Others 266 150 86 1,127 
Total 
_ 8,108 8,593 8,495 9,102 
Notes : *Ntliwer of*proects.
a.hIternational Development ExchangeProgram.
Sources : EPB( I990a)and EPB( 199 1a). 
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and Italy, ahile deVelopmental motivations are strong in the case of West 
Germany. There is also the well-knom bias in per capita aid l~o against.'s 
large (poIpulous) countries. This large-councry bias is explained by several 
reasons. Aid programs are usually organized on a nation-by-nation basis 
rather than on a potpulation basis. Ftirtlhenioie, a IspoptIlation increases, the 
marginal political benefit and the perceived economic benefit of giving more 
aid decreases w%'hc coi pa red wvith aid t ] :S pslllous cotinntries.221 
Technical Assistance. The volume of Korean leclnical aid has been 
small. Korea's annual disburseinenits of technical assistaice never rose 
over S 10 million until 1990. Korean technical assistance mainly involves 
flows of people, ei her in viting trainees and stulents rom developing
countries Or dispatching Kor'dl CXpertS to these con.vries. in spite of the 
small size oft his type ofaid, at least eight different government ministries 
are involved in implementing Korea's teclical assistance policy. But a 
maj or portion of th ctccliiiical aid imanagement has been carried out bytwo
miin istries, t ie M FA and the M ii st r' olSciencea rid Technology (MOST).
The different types a id voltimes of1 technical assistance and tlie 
adninistration ministries in'holved are slomci in Table 4.7. As the table 
indicates, the volume of loreai teclinical assistance in terns of U.S. 
dollars has not exhibited a clear increasing trend in recent years. 
Tech nical assistance, like a capital grant, begins w'vith a retiuest foras­
sistance fi-om the developinig contUt y's .o\rnient 
. The MFA and MOST
 
evaluate the requests, and MOST makes planis fur implementinlg approved

aid. TEhen tile Korea Science ai l Engineering Fou ndat ion does tlie work of
 
inviting trainees and assigning hieiii to tiraining institutions in Korea.The
 
Korea Science and Engineering Fontnd,,tion aiso does the work of'rcarch­
ing for and selecting appropriate experts to to
dispatcli developing 
countries. In the case of'teclinical assistance involving other ministries. 
each ministry makes its , '\'ci plans and informs tle MFA of'the plan. The 
implementation is also tlie responsibility of' each ministry. 
Korean government officials belive that Korea's tcclinicalassistance is 
of great V'aIne to developing countries because ( 1) Korea's development 
22) Sec Do'ving dud Hicmcnz (1985) for empirical e'idcnce. 
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experiences are more relevant to the developing Courtries, and (2) the level of 
Korean technology is only slightly ahead of the technology levels of these 
deveioping countries. Therefore, technology assistance should be 
tile area of 
emphesis of Korea's future ODA progran. A unique program of Korean 
tech­
nical asSIstance is its International Development Exchange Program 
(IDEP) 
which tk-gan in 1982. The program is operated by tile Korea Development 
In­
for the main purlx)se of introducing Korea's experiences in its stitute (IKDI) 
tation process to high-ranking govenment officials of developingindusti ii 
countres. The program consists ofthree major pals: Policy Forum, Seminar 
Country Specific Program. Over a 9-year periodand Workshop, and 
a total of 890)persons from developing countries attended (1982- 1990), 
forums or workshops which usually lasted oneort wo weeks. 
Both tile training and thee <Certs dispatch programs have been 
most ac­
tive in such areas as agriculture and fisheries; science, education, 
and 
administration; and mining ,ond manufacttiring (see Table 4.8). The geo­
a bias 
graphical distribution of the ttainees and experts programs slow. 
towards the Asian countries in the allocation of aid. Of the 3, 138 
trainees 
1990, 1,644 trainees (52 percent) were from-Korea received during 1985 
Asiancountries. In the same period, the AsiancoIntries' shareofinvolve­
ment intheexpertsdispatch program was 61 percent. 
Trainee and Students and Dispatch of Experts'Table 4.8 
t 
Trainees and Students Dispatch of Experts 
(1963- 1990) (1967- 1989)
Area of Assistance 
Persons Percentage! Persons 'Percentage 
199 46.82,267 31.1 1Ap~icuLure &Fishery 
Science, Education 2,017 27.7 103 24.2 
and Administration 
11.1 98
Miningand Manufacturing 809 
6 1.4Health and Social Affairs 1,492 20.5 
4.5707 9.7 19Others 
425 100.0Total 7,292 100.0 1 
Excludes technical assistance administered by the ministries other than Note: a. 

MAFand MOST.
 
Sources: MFAand EPB( 1991 a).
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In spite of the small volume of technical assistance by Korea, the 
recipients oftheaid are large in number. In 1990, fhrexample, tie MOST 
and MFA together accepted 444 trainees horn 77 countries. In the pre­
vious year, there were 432 trainees from 105countries. In 1989, theMOST 
alone dispatched 66 experts to 2 1 COlntries. Tie budget allocated for this 
was 203 million won ($0. 1million). Therefore, ascan be seen inTable4.9, 
the dispatch of Korean experts Was dLL., rse in terms of areas of expertise 
and destination countries, bt the assistance received by individual 
recipients in terms of the number of experts and the period during which 
theexperts worked was 'ery small. 
Table 4.9 Dispatch of Expertsby MOST, 1989 
Country Area 
India Electronics 
Indonesia Resotrce prole 
Geological survey 
Resource development 
Technologycooperation 
Oil probe, drilling 
Briquet manufacturing 
Malaysia Resource prob.e 
Geological survey 
Resource development 
Technology cooperation 
Genetic engineering 
Korean language 
Technology cooperation 
Nepal Sericulture 
Pakistan Aulomation system 
Semiconductor processing 
Forestry 
Philippines Sericulture 
Mine security management 
Thailand Teaching (university) 
Rural development 
Research guidance 
Rural guidance 
Period Nutmnber ofErts 
Experts 
1 year I 
8 days I 
8 days I 
8 lays 2 
8 days I 
I month 2 
I month I 
4 d.vs I 
4 day. I 
4 days 2 
4 days I 
9 days 2 
8 months I 
5 days 2 
IC days 2 
15 days I 
12 days I 
7 months I 
35 days I 
I m1lontl h I 
1 year 2 
15 days I 
15 days I 
I days I 
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Paddycultivation 15 days I 
Sericuhure 15 days I 
Agricultural machine operation 15 days I 
Plant cultivation 15 days I 
Technology cooperation 4 days 2 
Resource probe,development 5 days 4 
Technology cooperation 5 days 
Bahrain Agriculture 2 months 
North Yemen Horticulture 3 months 
Equatorial Guinea Telephone installation I lonth 
Ethiopia Econoly I month I 
Glana Rice fanning 1 year 
Kenya Job training 36 (lays 2 
Mala%%i Sericulture 35 days 
Italy SCriculture 18 days 
Hungary Economic development 42 days 
Yugoslavia Technology development potlicy 9 days I 
Argentina Inland water culture 2 months 
Ecuador Agricultural machine operation 40 days I 
Bolivia Sericulture 2 months 2 
Colombia Sericulture 3 nonths 
Electronic:,, communikation I I days 
Electronics, communication I months 2 
Costa Rica Research management 16 days I 
Research personnel 16 days I 
Accounting, budget 16 days I 
Paraguay Sericulture 2 months I 
Peru Rice fanning 53 days I 
Total 66 
Sotrce: Ministryof'Scicnceand Technology statistics. 
Engineering service aid provides consulting serx-ices conceming develop­
ment projects. It includes such services as project identification, feasibility 
study, site survey, detailed design, and conistnk.tion supervision. Frequently, 
engineering serxice aid is not an end in itself but is a means for increasing 
oppXrtunities for Korean firms to participate in devClopment projects. Need­
less to say, those linus that participated in conducting site surveys or making 
project identification had better chances of securing the contracts. 
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In 1989, Korea provided I0such deVelh)pment consulting services total­
ing $1.9 million. The recipient countries and related projects listed in 
Table 4. 10. 
Table 4. 10 Recipients andSize ofEngineering 
Service Aid, 1989 
Country Project Aid value 
(US $thousand) 
Papua New Guinea Feasibilitystudyadldetailedl 143 
Bangladesh 
Bangladesh 
design ofa drainage work 
Detailed design fora bridge 
Long-term telephone facility 
156 
274 
Pakistan 
Thailand 
Costa Rica 
Indonesia 
Indonesia 
Others 
plan
Tunnel contsrutlc iont 
Agricultural development 
Technology research center 
Agricultural de'elpnt 
Training center construction 
47 1 
73 
7 
59 
69 
626 
Total 1,878 
S)urce:EPB (1990a). 
Korea also sends medical personnel and Taekwondo (Korean martial 
art) coaches to developing countries upon request. The dispatchmnent of 
these people is classified as technical assistance for special purposes. In 
1990, 19 medical personnel were sent to 13 developing countries at a cost 
of $871,000, and 17 Taek wondo coaches and an archery coach were sent 
to 15 countries at a cost ofs 398,000. 
Of the assistance types listed in Table 4. 7, the Training Center refers to 
assistance used for establishing job training centers in Indonesia and 
Gabon (Korea promised these countries to help build training centers in 
1982). In addition to plroviding job training equipment, Korea has train­
ed local instructors and dispatched Koean advi,.ers in the past several 
years to tllese countries for the projects. The assistance of training and 
adviser dispatch is counted in Trainees and Students and Dispatch of 
Experts. Therefore only the value of equipment suplied is counted as a 
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separate type of technical assistance. 
Other types of technical assistance include support for joint research 
prog.-ams between research institutions of Korea and developing 
count ries. Also included in 'Others' are the training and experts dispaich 
program specifically for the OAS kOrganization of American States) and 
the Korea- ASEAN cooperation program. The latter, which was started in 
budget of $ I million, funded various activities undertaken1990 with a 
during ASEAN week in Korea and the education of Korean language in the 
ASEAN cOnntries. 
Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF) Loan. The EDCF 
loan is the Korean version of concessionary long-term loans to developiig 
countries. The EDCF was established on June 1, 1987 with the purpose of 
contributing to the id ustrial deveclopment ofor economic stabilizat ion in 
loans. The EDCF isdeveloping countries through the extension of soft 
under the management of the Ministry of Finance and the Export-Import 
(EXIM) Bank of Korea is responsible for the execution of the loan agree­
ment andadministration work related to extending loans. 
kinds: (I) loans made directly toAn EDCF loan can be of two 
(2) loans togovernments or corporations of dev'eloping 	countries and 
or ventures in developingKorean corporations for equity inwestr.ent 
cointries. 
There are five types of EDCF loans to developing couintries 
1.Project Loan : A project loan provides funds needed to conduct 
specificdevelopment projects. 
2. 	Lquipment Loan:The funds are only to be used forthe procurement of 
equipment and oher materials needed for industrial developmlent 
proj ect sin l eci fic sectors or specific region s. 
3. Two-Step Loan : The funds are pro\vided to governments or financial 
institut ions so that they can make sub-loans to end-users in order to 
procure equiipment and other materials. 
4. 	Commodity Loan : Funds are used for the importing of commodities 
for the purpose Of' coltributing to econollic stabilization of a 
developingcountry. 
5. Project Preparation Loan : This loan provides funds for the prep­
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aration of development projects including feasibility studies and 
detailed design. 
After identifying a developnent proj ect and studying its feasibility, the 
prospective recipient government officially makes a loan request to tile 
Korean government by submitting tile request and sIpporting docuients 
to the Korean embassy in the country. The MOF. having received tile loan 
request, requests the EXIM Bank of Korea to Stld' the informalion pro­
vided. The Bank prepares an appraisal report of the project. Taking intoac-
COutI the appraisal report, the MOF,through consLltations with tile mnin­
istries concerned, decides whether or not to finance the project. Ifthe de­
cision is to finance the project, the MFA infforms tile borrower of Korea's 
willingness to extend a loan,the total anmount ofthe loan, and soon. An 
agreement is then concluded between the Korean go\'eninit and the re­
cipient government, stating tile basic financing terms anid conditions. 
After the Exchange of Notes (E/N) is concluded, subsequent procedures 
such as the Loan Agreement, ProCUrelni-'lt, Disbursenent, Supervision, 
and Evaluationare largely carriedout by the EX IM Bank. 
As stated above, the loan is officially initiated at the request of 
borrowing countries. But, in reality, an EDCF loan is initiated by the 
Korean General Trading Companies orconstruction companies which are 
involved with large development projects indeveloping countries. These 
Korean firms ask their government to use an EDCF loan as a illeans of in­
creasing Korea's commodity expons and Korea's participation in develop­
ment projects (I-1,bollllock Chung 1989). 
Although the EDCF loan is offered in Korean currency, the borrowing 
cOtLintry is not reqliled to procure all goods and services from Korea. Of­
ficially the borrowing country is only required to procure goods and 
services from eligible source cotll ries whicli areagreed upon bet ween tile 
Korean govefnllleltt anrd tile recipient governlellt. Borrowers are nor­
really required to obtain goods and services through International Com­
petiti'e Bidding (ICB) a Ill) )gsullpplictsof sotlrceco tries.nil 

In spite Of'tIese glideliIes regarding procurement, the borrowers' pro­
curement must neverthless be from Korean sulppliers becau SC tile Korean 
currency at present is not accepted as a means of payment in other 
countries. Therefore all EDCF loan, unlike DAC members' concessionary 
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loans, is a 100-percent tied loan. 
IThe terins and con dit ions ofhoans to deve oping countries are slo l in 
Table 4.1 1. For EDCF loans to Korean corporations, the financial terms 
and conditions are slightly stricter, with interest rates bet ween 5 percent 
and damaltlrnt'of less than 15 years. 
By the Chd of 1990, the total VO'lumHe ol the EDCF stood at 194.5 billion
 
won (abolut $275 ,11illion). Of that a111o1.ut, I 10 billion Won wasifroIm
 
Table4.11 Terms and Conditions of EDCF Loans to
 
Developing Countries
 
Loan ainiotint 	 Upto teie total of foreign ctLrrency costs) in11n ex­
ceptional case, a portionl )fthe local currency 
costs may be finaticed by the FDC F) 
Interest rate 	 Bet ween 2.5 percent and 5.0 percent per antun 
dependinrig on the per capita GNP of' tile 
borrowing couIntr.' 
Maturity 	 Up to 20 yea rs, i lc IIrdi igiagrace period (25 years
for ILLDCs) 
Grace period 	 UptoS years(7 years forl.LDCs) 
Repayment 	 Sem i-annual installments 
Interest payment 	 E'ery 6 nonths 
Loan detloriii-	 Korean wol 
ntitotn 
Source:EXIM Baik o 	Korca(1990). 
governmett stbscriptions during 1987 - 40 billion won was1990 alild
obtained tI rotlugh borrom\iing. The remaining 44.5 billion won was 
obtairted ftrn earn inrgs frori tihe frInd mianagcient. According to the 
government plan, tile total fund is exlpected to increase by $104 million 
dutring 1991 (EXIM BatikofKorea 1991:1 31P31991 a). 
During the period 1987 - 1990, a total of129 coIuntrrcs made loan 
requests concerning 67 development projects. The total amount of tie 
loans requested was about SI billion. As of the end of April 1991, 9 
projects of 9 countries were chosen to receive EDCF loans totaling 64.1 
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billionwon ($87.4million).
 
The projects to teceive 
ieEI)CF loans and the size and coilttitions ollte 
loans are li:;ted in Table 4. 12. The largestI oan of's 14.5 million wvasgranIed 
to a road cons:rtctilio project illSri L nka. The duration of the loans is 
either 20 ot 25 xe<r. The intieret, taC is 3.5 o r 4.0 percent !"r Ihllose 
prlojCcts .elctCLd bfto're 1991 a ind 2.5 perctnl 1(r llhose selected in 1991. 
Almong the projects appioved rtloal dssiStdlce, loan disbursetments 
wre llade for) nl meicpr(ject, N igcrii's rai!\\ul\'\licleiloderniz,iiion plail, 
1l1twil itlnd of1 1990. lIncreased loin distI reMeltics 0rapl)lroCd ro(jects ate 
expected in 199 1and thereaftier. 
An EDCF ioclat to a Korcan firn for equity investment illdeveloping
 
Countries was undertaken fort he first little in 
1990. A loan offS864,000
 
was given to a Kora-Philippine 
 pillt VCntlure folr tclisilg Silksvorms and
 
matifacti 
i.og silk threat illthle PhililPiles. Tilohlan was for I5years at
 
an interest ialeof 5 I)CrcLilt.
 
The EDCFI is exe<'ctd to hcCt1C the ie .(diill pLlll)Olenlt
of l(orea's ODr
 
progratmt within the next few ycars.2"' 
The Korean government is planning
 
to stibstatially increase tile size of its ODA, 
 aild concessiaily loans are
 
easierto iicreasc thai grants oriechnicaiassi sta ice. Loan s ha vean appar­
elt d\'altage oLver gratls in terms of the gov"erment expanding its aid
 
bulget becaLise it ileans increasedopportunities for Korean CIxpt 
 lS and
 
ovl'seas cllstrtictioll contracts.
 
Multilateral ODA of Korea 
The share ofinultilaieral aid in Korea's total ODA has been very high, 
ranging froim 56 percent to 95 lercen illile I980s. Fortlhe DAC countries,
 
the average share has been adl-OtllLt
30 percent. This high ratio reflects two 
characteristics of Korea's ODA.One characteristic is that other forms of de­
velopncnit assistance such as grants and technical assistance were \ely
 
23) Thegrhcperidl lo,2 5-yerlon is7years aid that fr a20-yearloan is 5 years.
24) Atcoridig i gmei plan, te loaleotnt disllrsement in 1991 is expected to 
reach $200 millioni (I-XhM of Korea 1991 ).iBank 
Table 4.12 EDCF Loan Projects 
Loan 
Country Project (US$ 
Indonesia Road construction 

Nigeria Railway ve'hicle purchase 

Peni Fishing boat purchase 

Fiji Bridge construction 

Ghana Conistruction of storage 

faciliLy for refined oil
 
Philippines Installation of 

telecommunication facility
 
Sri Lanka Road construction 

Jordan Construction of sewage control facility 

Uganda :nstallation of
 
tclecommunication facility 
Total 
SUrce: EPB ( 99 la). 
Amount 
million) 
11.0 
10.0 
9.8 
6.2 
13.0 
5.4 
14.5 
10.0 
7.5 
87.4 
Duration and Decision 
lnerest Rate Date 
(years/%) 
25/3.5 12/87 
20/4.0 12/87 
20/3.5 12/88 
20/4.0 7/89 
20/3.5 3/90 
20/3.5 5/90 
20/3.5 8/90 
25/2.5 3/91 
25/2.5 4/91 
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small in size. A second characteristic is that in presentingtheODA figures, 
the Korean government inchdes all subscription payients and grants to 
ltilateral institutions as development assistance. As pointed out 
earlier, some of the subscriptions are .tot regarded in other Countries as 
m1ultilateral aid. 
Table 4.13 shows Korea's capital sulscriptions to various multilateral 
instititions during the period 1986 - 1990. Ill 1986, capial sulIscription 
payments and other similar payments to multilateral institutions 
Table 4.13 Subscription Payments to Multilateral
 
Institutions, .983 - 1990 (US$ thousand)'
 
1986 1987 
 1988 1989 
 1990
 
IMF 76,044 21,738 - 35,506 -
World Bank Group
 
IBRD 
 2,252 9,148 17,353 - 14,882 
IDA 1 2,616 6,189 6,959 7,581 12,180 
IFC 
- 1,756 585 585 3,637 
MIGA 
- - 971 - -
Asian Development Bank GroupI
 
ADB 4,432 4,610 - - -

ADF 
 384 1,250 1,741 1,250 1,250 
TASF 150 150 150 - 150
 
Africa Development Bank Group
 
AFDB 
 662 1,343 1,511 640 711 
AFDF 3,018 3,724 4,188 6,185 12,370
 
Comtnmon Fund 

- - 311 291 356
 
Others '
 
-
-
- 15,61 1 951 
Total !89),558 49,908 33,769 67,649 46,847 
Notes a. Since some of thle raw data wcrc giveni in Korean woi, te dollar 
amounts reported in this lale dpetil on the exchange rates used ini 
making the cotri,erion. The rates tsed herc arhe teaverages duringeach 
year, i. e.. won/s rates: 1986-881.45. 1987-822.57, 1988-731.­
47, 1989-671.46,and 1990-707.76. 
b. Contribtions tot wo internatimal satellite organizations by the Minis­
try ofComnmnitnicai ion. 
Sources : Statistics from the EPB, M FA, andiBank of Korea. 
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amounted to $89.6 ni;llion. But if the payments to.the IMF are excluded, 
this amount is reduced to $23.5 million and the total ODA of the year is 
reduced to $35.5 million instead of $111.5 million as cited in Table 4.3. 
TheOD A/GNP rate is also reduced from .1 Ipercent to 0.03 percent. 
Table 4.14 Grants to Multilateral Institutions, 
1986-1990 (US$ thousand) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 5-y'-arl'otal 
ESCAP 
UNCTAD 
UNIDO 
UNEP 
34 
97 
89 
10 
31 
95 
250 
10 
32 
125 
144 
10 
32 
130 
368 
19 
-
-
485 
15 
129 
447 
1,336 
64 
GATT 
APDC 
513 
35 
665 
46 
772 
45 
777 
45 
996 
80 
3,723 
251 
UNDP 565 712 757 1,104 630 3,768 
UNICEF 137 160 170 300 400 1,167
 
FAO 436 359 623 584 724 2,726
 
UNESCO 350 365 588 755 660 2,718
 
WHO 444 467 517 526 691 2,645
 
WIPO 38 47 48 42 54 229
 
WTO 36 45 61 87 95 324
 
APO 128 138 141 164 369 940
 
ASPAC 225 225 225 225 225 1,125
 
ITU - - - 294 1,266 1,565 
Others 1,800 2,139 2,471 3,264 3,630 13,304
 
Total 4,937 5,754 6,729 8,721 10,320 36,461 
Note - = zero or near zero 
Source EPB (1990a). 
Grants to muLtilateral institutions consist largely ofassistance to United 
Nations' agencies but include support to many other international 
organizations as well. In 1990, for cxi.nple, a total of $10.3 million was 
disbursed to more than 80 UN agencies and international organizations. 
Majorrecipients and amounts during 1986 - 1990aregiven inTable4.14. 
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Ofall the international organizations or UN agencies, the UNDP receives 
the largest portion of Korean grants. This also seems to be the case in other 
countries as concessionary disbursement by the UNDP is larger than that 
2of any other UN agency. ' 
The Quality of Korean Aid 
From a recipient country's viewpoint, foreign aid is more valuable if' it 
is given at more concessionary terms and when it has less procurement 
reqtuirements attached to it. Iii this sense, an outright cash grant ith no 
procurement tying is aid of the highest quality.
The degree of concessiin of a loan is (letermined by the grant equiv­
alent. A full grant has a grant equiv'alent of 100 percent of its value and a 
commercial loan has a grant equivalent of' 0 percent. Al overall 
meas'!re of concession of a Cotlnry's ODA can be determined using the 
grant elelent formula \ liich reduces tile value of the total aid flow to 
its grant equivalent and then expresses this grant equivalent as a per­
centage of the total nominal flow. 
DAC has established (luantitative nornIs for aidl in financial terms. Ac­
cording to the Recontendat ion on Terms and Conditions of Aid adopted
in 1972 and amended in 1978, each member'sannual ODAshould hav'eat 
least all 86 percent grant element on a three-yeara'erage of aid to each of
 
the LLDCs. As shown in Table 4.15, 
 the grant elements of ODA
 
commitments 
of all DAC mcnbers, except Italy, have increased over 
time. Japan has yet to reach tile DAC norm of86 percent.-"" In 1989, only

France failed to 
 reach tile 90 percent target for the least developed
 
COUlntries.
 
25) See OECD (990}.rablc27.

2) The low grant element ofJapanese ODA is due to tile
r latively Iowshare ofgranto.in Japan's ODA. In 1989, the share was 52 percent and it was the second lo;-'est
after thatofAustria among the DAC membxrs. 
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Table 4.15 Grant Element of ODA Commitments 
of DAC Members 
{GrantElement of Total ODA Grant Element of 
ODAtoLLDCs 
_1965-1966 1980--1981 _1989 1975-1 976 ___1989 
Australia 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Austria 38.0 61.4 - 89.5 96.0 
Belgitnn 97.8 97.9 - 98,9 100.0 
Canada 96.7 97.6 100.0 97.7 100.0 
Denmark 83.6 96.6 100.0 91.4 100.0 
Finland - 96.5 99.3 86.3 100.0 
France 87.7 89.9 - 96.4 10.0 
Germany 67.7 86.7 - 90.1 98.0 
Ireland - -. 100.0 - 100.0 
Italy 49.6 94.0 85.6 100.0 96.0 
Japan 55,4 74.7 80.1 78.1 92.0 
Netherlands 86.5 93.0 95.0 94.5 100.0 
NewZealand - 100.0 - 100.0 100.0 
Norway 99.0 Q9.8 - 100.0 100.0 
Sweden 92.6 99.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Switzerland -8.8 97.0 100.0 93.9 100.0 
United kdngdom 79.6 96.8 99.0 99.3 100.0 
UnitedStates . 88.3 92.4 98.5 81.2 97.9 
Total 84.0 89.7 90.9 )1.3 95.1 
Source : OECD(i 985, 1990). 
In the case of Koiea's ODA, all aid v.,is in the form off. rants before 1989 
and, therefore, the grnt element of Korea's total ODA should be 100 
percent foryears before 1989. Grants and capital subsciptionsto multilat­
eral agencies; are all treated as grants folloing the OECU Iuies of grant el­
ement calculation. The $ 1.8 million EDCF loan disbursed in 1989 had a 
grant element of 39.4 percent. Therefore the grant element of total Korean 
ODA in 1989 was 98.9 percent. In 1990, the $9.9 million EDCF loanhada 
grant element of 38.5 percent. "'Thus the figure for the total ODA turned out 
to be 93.2 percent. Therefore Korean ODA has net the DAC target in financial 
27) For calculating the grant elcnent, a discount rate of 10 percent was used and 
semi-annual installitent was assumed. Anong $9.9 itillion, $8.6 million had a 
maturity of 15 ycars with a 5-year grant period and the interest rate was 5 percent. 
The remaining loan's condition was a 20-year maturity with a 5-year grace period 
and a 4 percent interest rate. 
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terms. Since th.e share of EDCF loans i:; expected to rise in coming years, how­
ever, the grantelement,'fKorean ODA may fall below the target level. 
Aid tying has been the most direct mechanism used by donors to pro­
mote their commercial interests. Donor countries have sought toj ustify 
and maintait .)ublic or parliamentary support fortheiraid programs byar­
guing that foreign aid serves domestic commercial interests through 
increased exports. Aid tying call be (I ) by source, requiring the recipient 
country to use tile foreign aid to purchase goods and services in the donor 
country, or (2) by end use, specifying the project, )roduct, or sector to 
wlich the aid wiil be allocated (Kruegeret al. 1989 :73). Often both forms 
of tying are used. 
Aid tying by source has been most prevalent and has been used by all 
bilateral donors. DAC members report this tying status each year. Ac­
cording to OECD (1990), 30.5 percent ofDAC ODA provided in 1988 was 
tied, wh1ile 7.6 percent was classified as partially untied.2 " The figures for 
1982 - 1983 are 30.0 percent and 7.2 percent, respectively, indicatingthat 
the tying staMs has not changed much in the 1980s. In 1988, Austria and 
Italy werc lie two countries with the highest tied aid ratios of 69 percent 
and 58 percent, respectively, while in the Netherlands and Japan the 
ral iosare reportedly 10 percent and II percent, respectively. It isgenerally 
believed, however, that some assistance, technically classified as untied, 
effecti rely renain, tied tothe donorcotIntry in practice. 
A large part of Korea's bilateral ODA s!,ould be classified as tied aid. 
Most grant aids are commodity grants such as those for transportation 
equipment, agricultural machinery, medical supplies, clothes, etc.; cash 
grants account for only a small portion. Of he $9 1.4 million grant aid dur­
ing the 1977- 1990 period, onjy $8.31 million, or 9 pe'cent. were cash 
grants. In 1990 thecash grant share wvasa iere 4percent. 2" 
Korea'. technical assistance is mostly tied as well. Assistance involv­
ing [lie invitation ofsIudents and trainees or KDI's IDEP program are fully 
tied. The dispatch of experts to developing Counlitries or tile provision of 
28) The tied or partially unticd ratios areactually the ratios ol't ied bilateral ODA or par­
tially untied bilaleral ODA to total ODA. Since most multilateral ODA isclassilied 
,is untiedticdhilaleralODAcan bereigard'd as total tied OI)A. 
29) Th is i nlonati t11 .'1nSobtained Iron i nt erna Idoc ents of KO ICA. 
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engineering services may involve a small portion ofintied aid ill thesense 
that soneio'the aid budgets are spent in the recipient countries. Ne'ertlie­
less, the untied portion of'overall technical assistance is very small. As noted 
earlier, EDCF loans, wiiicl are oflered in won, are virtually 100 percent tied. 
Considering this tying status ofdi ffTerent bi lateral ODAs, it can be safely 
con1cluded that at least 90 percent of Korean bilateral ODA is tied a id. Since 
bilateral aid ]ccounted for 36 percent of total ODA in 1990, it call be said 
that at least 33 percent of Korean ODA was tied in that year. I ithe multilat­
eral ODA portio dcClintes and bilateral loanis increase in the futture, which 
is what most people expect wiII ha ppen, ilen the tied aid rati os of Korean 
ODA will rise Contlltiluously for some years to come. 
The EDCF law and the grant aid regulation state that otne main purpose 
of assistance is to increase tile level of economic transactions with the 
recipients. In reality, one of the purposes of establishing the EDCF was to 
help diversify Korean expor: markets atnd secure import soturces of raw 
materials from deVeloping coultries (M.Chluing 1989: I). 
The increase in Korean exports that resuts from aid tying, however, is 
very stuall compared with the size of total Korean exports. For instance, 
even if \e assume that all grant a ids and EDCF loans in 1990 were used to pur­
chase goods from Korea, tle increased exports frm tied aid \ould only be 0.­
03 percent of the year's total exports. Tlerefore the balance-of-payments ef­
kIct ofaid tying is negligible. ""Even if'all Korean bilateral aid becomes coin­
pletel' untitied, the demand fr Korea's goods and services 1ill rise if 
Korean goods and services arecompetit ive in tlie world imirket, and theaid 
to these countries in turn increases their demand for goods and services 
overall or increases their foreign exchange holdings. 
The quality of a country's ODA can also be rmeasured by criteria other 
than thegrant elemient ordirect tyi ng by source. The qualityof aid mnay rise 
if it is used for tile poorest people ofthe recipient countries ratlher than for 
Icommercially interesting' projects. 	 assumesMosley (1985) that tile 
greaterthe part of theaid that is devoted to niral development and social in­
frastructure, rather than to industrial development, urban housitng, etc., 
30) 	 The increased exports or )roducition could have significant efkTct s fora particular 
industry or a firm. 
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the greater the proportion ofa id itt ich goes directly to the poor. In the case 
of the DAC countries, on average, 35 percent of their bilateral aid was 
allocated to agriculture and social infrastructure in 1989 (OECD 1990: 
2 17). For Korea, this information is not a vailable, but byexatuining theap­
proved EDCF projects and the composition of grant ai d supplies, the pro­
portion of Korean bilateral aid allocated to Ihe agrict Ittiral and social in ra­
struc.!ure sectors lo,ki smaller than the DAC average. Almost all of the 
EDCF projects are either lot econornmic infra st ruc tire such tranlspor­as 
tation and commu nication or for ma nlactuti ug. Grant aids are mostly for 
industrial prod ocrikn or Iransportation although some agricultural 
machineries are included. 
Another criterion for measuring aid quciality coold be the proportion of 
aid going to the LLDCs. This is based on the assumption that a giv"en 
amount of aid is wVort h more in a veiy poor couit'ty than in a less poor 
count r,. " ' Also, as Mosley (1987 : 72) argues, the largerthe total number 
ofcountries to which aid is provided, the lower the aid quality becomes as 
diploniatic interest is the main factor behind theallocation of aid which is 
spread across the largest numtuberof'coutries as possible. 
On both counts, Korean ODA must be judged to be Iow i ' quality. Korea's 
$20 million or $30 million a ye:, .f bilateral ODA has been spread across
 
nearly 100 countries. As shown in Table 4.6, among the 23 countries that
 
have received more than $1 million ingrant aid from Korea, 9cotintriesare 
LLDCs. But of the 9 countries that as of the end of I990decided to receive 
EDCF loans, onlyonecountry, Uganda, belonged to the LLDCs. 
Judging by financial terms or tying status or any combination of the 
above-mentioned qtuality indicators, DAC ODA as a whole experienced 
slight quality improvement overthe years. On theotherhand, Korean ODA 
is expected to experience a deterioration in quality in the near future, 
though this trend is expected to reverse itself sometime in the late I 990s. 
The rapid increase of EDCF loans and their share in Korean ODA over the 
next several years will lower the giant element of Korea's total ODA and 
raise the portion of tied aid. 
31) Aid to LLDCs accounted tor 24 percent of total DAC aid in 1989. In 1988, it was 26 
percent. 
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FIVE 
Korea's Aid Philosophy and Aid Adninisttion 
Aid Philosophy 
To date, Korea's economic aid has been provided without clearly de­
fined principles or philosophies. As many government officials admit, 
Korea's ODA has been repetitions of past aid operations by the individual 
ministries without consideration of the targets oreffects of the aid from the 
national or global point of v'iew. The two dominant types of Korea's bilat­
eral aid, grants and technical cooperation, have been allocated as broadly 
as possible so that the size of the aid for any particular recipient has been 
v'cry small. There has not bee i any serious discussion concerning the 
principlesofaidallocation or types ofaid or aid evaluation. 
As the data on aid show, total bilateral aid from Korea has been miniimal 
in the past. The small volume of aid, however, did notjustify the govern­
ment's lack of endeavors to review its lid administration or to clarify its 
aid philosophy. This situation is to be changed, and Korea's aid policy is 
about to enter a new stage. Individuals from both inside and outside the 
government advocate the idea that a substantial increase in Korea's ODA 
volume 'overashort periodoftimie is important as a basic policy goal. The 
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beginning of won loans as the third type of Korea's bilateral ODA and the 
creation ofthe KOICA represent concrete steps toward this policy goal. 
In the past, Korea's economic aid to other countries was unkno%,n to 
most Koreans. And many government officials regarded economic aid 
merely as a means ofoblaining support from Third World countries in the 
diplomatic offense against North Korea. It was generally believed that 
Korea was not rich enough to afford economic aid that is purely motivated 
by humanitarian purposes. 
For any country, however, the primary motivation of economic aid 
should be the alleviation of'poverty in developing countries. Still, a com­
prehensive review of past ODA by DAC countries reveals that develop­
menit aid has done nuch less to reducc poverly than might have been 
hoped (World Bank 1990:127). The most important for this isreason 
simply that much of this aid has not been directly concerned with eco­
nonic dev'elolment of or poverty reduction in recipient countries. lfa sub­
stantial proportion ofaid is provided at least partly for putrposes otliertlhan 
to promote developmtent, tile impact ofaid on poverty will be smaller than 
it might have been. 1, 
Forthe reduction of poverty, ODA must help recipient countries to grow 
continuously without continuing their dependence on foreign aid. Actu­
ally, "sustainable and equitable development" swas choseLby DAC as tie 
guiding theme for setting the development cooperation priorities for the 
I990s (OECD I 989:Chap. 2). At its best, dev'elopment assistance should 
help developing countries in their o%%in efforts to improve their economic 
and development policies. In this respect, Korea's grant aid, which has 
been provided on an ad hoc basis without co:sideration of the longer-term 
impacts, needs an overall review. A comprehensive planning and 
administration ofaid provision is required if Korea'said is to contribute to 
sustainableand equitabledevelopment of'poorcountries. 
This humanitarian view ofecononmic aid is closely related with the no­
tion that we all live in one global village. In loday's world of increasingly 
32) For example, itis said that only 8 percent of the U.S. aid program in1986 could l 
identified as development assistance low-income countries tWorldto 
 Bank
 
1990:128) 
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interdependent countries, one country's econ1onlic conditioll ilflttences 
tileeconomic conditions of other countries. The sta We growth oft he world 
economy is not possible without sustainable economic development of 
poor counltries. Contributing to environnlniaIially sound development is 
one particular aiin of developmert assistance in today's interdependent 
world. It is essential that all countries actively participa:e in confronting 
global en vironnental issues. Combatiig def orestation aid deserli fication 
and protecting the ozone layer, for instance, ate among tile central 
concerns. A priority !sk fOr aid is to assist developing countries ill 
idetitifying and managing these environmental problems (see the dis­
cuIssion in the text below). 
The importance of economic development or economic stabili­
zation in developing countries for Korea's long-term growth has been 
well recognized by Korean policyiakers. The EDCF Law whbich was 
promulgated in December 1986 states that the ma in purpose of'the EDCF is 
to assist de'eloping countries in implementing projects w;'hich contribute 
to their industrial development or econonic stabilization. The KOICA 
Law' promtnth,ted in Janunary 1991 also states that tile purpose Of 
establishing tile KOICA is to assist econoim ic and social development in 
certairl countries and to enhance friendly cooperation bet wcen Korea and 
these cotintries." 
Government officials at the EPB or tie M FA,however, emphasize that 
since Korea's OD A program is at its initial stage %%ithlimited a'ailabilityof' 
resources, Korea cannot avoid considering her own national interest in 
determining its aid policies. This view of Korean policymakers, which 
emphasizes national interest, isgencrally supported byt liebusiiess sector 
and the researchers of'this subject. C.Kim (1989) suggests that theempha­
sis of Korea's ODA policy should be on tile pursuit of mutual economic 
benefits rather than on the hunanitarian aspects of the aid. Rha and Song 
(1989:201 -203) assert that national security and national ecotnoinic 
interests should bethedrivi ngforcebehirid (Korea's ODA policy. Although 
33) The'ccrrain' countries areto bedetermined bythe Ministerof Foreign Affairs based 
oilconsiderations of inconie levels. industrial structures, and stages of develop­
ment of the countries. 
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they warn policyniakers against too ntich emlphasis on national interest 
in setting ODA policies, they ne'ertheless note that since Korea is illihe 
transition process towards beconing 11nadValced industrial society, 
national econoiic interest and national security should be considered 
more I iportant as goals of Korea's ODA than econoi"ic development of 
the recipients. Their notion of national economic interest has three 
aspects. The first aspect is that ODA hClps the,dcClinilq industrial sectors 
iflov'e out of Korea to recipient cotint riCs. The second and third aspects are 
that ODA expands KorCall eXpois and ODA increases Korea's resourcede-
Velolinenl aclt iVit illf'orCign COllries. 
Since Korea's ODA volume is small, policytnakcrs believe that focusing 
oila f'vcountriCS illthe allocation ofa id rather than Ihinly distributing it 
among many countries will restlt in better effects of the aid. IlIihe cas of'
 
EDCE loans, six countries were selected in 1989 as priority coLintries;
 
they are Indonesia, the Ph ilippi nt's, Thailand, 
 Pakistan, Nigeria, and 
Colombia. 
Major donor countries hav"e their oxii ipriority countries. The allocation
 
of U. S. bilateral aid, for exainple, has been closely related tothe political
 
circunmiances atnd the 'military resoitrces' of'recipien: countries. The
 
massive aid to Israel, Egypt, South Viet iam, and other coulntries in iile
 
Middle East and South Asia in the I960s and I970s reflected ihis bias(U.
 
S. Congress Budget Office I980:Appendix II). France directs her aid pri­
marily to 
 former French colonies, which are also those de'eloping
 
countries 
witl, which France has the closest trade relations. Unlike the 
United States, France (foes not appear to take global political and security 
interests into account in its aid allocations(Maizels and Nissanke 1984). 
Trade interest!; have dominated the Japanee aid patterns %tiich initially 
focusedon Asia, but havespread recently to uther areas. 
Korea has neither global political interests nor former colonies. But 
Korea has important trade interests with some tieel)ilg countries and 
diplomnatic interests with many couIntries in relation to the situation of 
continuing confrontation with North lKorea. Recently there have been a 
few attutnpts to determine appropriate criteria for selecting the recipients 
of' Korea's ODA. Rha and Ha (1989) suggested five criteria, namely, 
gro\th potential, degree of self-help, requirement of foreign capital, ca­
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pacity to pay back foreign debt, and potential for economic linkage with 
Korea. Using these criteria, they selected 20 countries including 8 African 
countriesand 7 Asian countries. 
H. Kim (1990) suggests a simpler method. Using the average of thret 
ratios i. e., the country's share in Korean exports, Korean imports, and 
Korean foreign direct investment, tile country with the highest average is 
said to be economically the most important developing count ry fOrKorea's 
ODA. According to Kim, thecountries which ranked high in this economic 
benefit rank and which shot1ld be priority countries in Korean aid allo­
cation are, in descending order, Indonesia, Malaysia, Yemen, Thailand, 
India, Oman, Panama, Papua NeWGuinea, andthe Philippines. 
None of these or other select ion methods have actually been used in the 
allocation of Korea's ODA except forthe select ion of'six priority countries 
like to haca deli nite guidingfor EDCF loans. Government officials wout 
rule, but they ha v'e not fouind one that is both reasonable and practical. It is 
worthy to note that neither Rha and Ila (1989) nor H. Kim (1990) include 
per capita GNP as a determinant of aid allocation. 
Aid Administration 
Tile Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Finance (MOF) have pri­
mary responsibility for Korean ODA. Responsibility for bilateral and 
to themutltilateral gtant aid and bilateral technical assistance belongs 
MFA, and the MOF approves and supervises capital subscriptions to 
multilateral financial organizations and bilateral concessionary loans. 
The Korea Internation al Cooperation Agency, Under the authority of 
tb MFA, h -dlest he implementation of bilateral grant aida tud techni­
bilateralcal assistance. Before KOICA began operation in April 1991, 
technical assistance was provided by several different ministries in­
cluding the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Science and Technology, 
Construction, Labor, and Communications, and the Economic Plan­
ning Board. Each of these ministries had separate budgets and plans for 
technical assistance, and the lack of policy coordination among the 
ministries wasblamed forinconsistencies and inefficiency in Korea's 
technical assistance program. 
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Table. 5. 1 AdministrationofKorean Aid 
Type of Aid Ministry Executive Agency 
Bilateral ODA 
*Grant Aid MFA Koryo Trade Co. 
*Technical Assistance
 
Trainees and Students MFAViOSTMOC, Korea Science and
 
Dispatch of Experts MOL, MOrni 
 Engineering Foundation, KOICA 
Korea Voc-t ,,inal Training4 After 
& Management Agency. April 
Agricultural Developmenl 1991 
Corp. etc. 
Engineering Service EPB MOC, MOST Construction Icclnology 
MOCI Corp., Agricultural 
Development Corp. etc. 
Special Assistance MFA
 
IDEP EP1 KDI
 
International Joint MOST KAIST
 
Research 
*EDCF loan MOF EXIM Bank of Korea
 
Multilateral ODA
 
*Grant Aid MFA 
­
*Capital Subscription to MOF Bank of Korea
 
Developtment Banks
 
With the establishment of KOICA, however, the role of the MFA in 
Korean ODA has increased as the MFA now%administers all of the 
Korean technical assistance which was prev'iously administered bythe 
different ministries. As Table 5. I shows, KOICA manages all of lhe 
technical assistance prograts as wvell as the grant aid program. KOICA 
is also responsible for the Korean Youth Voltunteers program and the 
em igrat ion anld overseas en ploymenit ofKorea ns. 
The Korean Youth Volunteers, like the Peace Corps of the United States or 
the Japan Overseas Cooperation Voluntec.,,. is a government-splosored vol­
unteer program. The program was established in 1989 and in September 
1990, 44 volunteers were sent to four Asian countries for the first 
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time to work with local people for at least two years in such fields as 
agriculture, health care, education and athletic coaching. Another 38 
volunteers were sent in September 1991 to seven countries. Before the 
establishment of KOICA, this p.ogralnwas tile responsibility of the 
Minis'ry of Education. 
Although em igrat ion and overseas eml)loymeit ot Koreans are not part 
of Korea's de'elopment assistance, the entry of' Koreans into foreign 
countries as immigrants or employees are facilitated by KOICA. This role 
of KOICA is mainly(die to the fact that the Korea Overseas Development 
Corporation which was previously responsible for this program was 
integrated into KO1CA. 
As of Fall 199 1, KOICA was stafled with about 2 10 persons including a 
president, a ice president, and fotir executive directors (see Table 5.2). 
The size of KOICA's staff will have to grow rapidly as the size of Korea's 
ODA and the corresponding need for foreign offices and development 
studies will growin tile near futu[re. But ho\ the natureand qualityof'grant 
aid and technical assistance will be changed by the establishment of 
KOICA is not yetclear. 
Since EDCF loans are provided by the MOF and grant aid all( technical 
assistance are provided bythe MFA, coordination between thesedifferent 
types of assistance programs becomes an important policy issue. When a 
coutliry or d partiicular project in a counry is selected for support, the type 
of assistance or the proportions of the different types of assistance must be 
clearly defined. In principle, coordination and decisions on basic ODA 
policy directions are tile responsibility of the Committee on Overseas Co­
operation, which was established in 1986 ill the EPB. All of the ministers 
of the ODA-related ministries are members of the committee and the EPB 
minister is the chairman Although the effectiveness of the committee in 
tile past is not clear, tie role oftlie comniittee will increase in the future as 
thesizeof Korean ODA increases. 
One type of assistance which is closely related to both EDCF and techni­
cal assistance is the grant of engineering services. Engineering services 
are usually provided for feasibility studies ofproposed projects or identifi­
cation of projects that 'ill receive EDCF loans. In this case, a question 
arises as to which organization should admninister tie engineering service 
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Table.5.2 Organization of KOICA 
General Affairs 
Excuctiv'e Director Department 
for General Affairs 
and Planning 
Planning n 
Department
President Presient fTechnical Cooper-
Exectiie Director aion Deparlment1,0r Technical1 
Coo(perationa 
Human Resoure 
Departmnento 
for Dev'lopment Cooperation
Cooperation Department 
Emigration 
Executi "e Director for Department
ViQce Emigration and 
President Overseas Employment 
Overseas Employ­
ment Department 
Director-General, Public Relations 
Public Relations and and Survey 
fSrvey''Office Department 
Excultive
 
Direcor
fD ctor% Director-General. 
Research and
 
Data BureaDt
 
Di rector- Genera, 1, 
Education and 
Train!,ig Bureau 
Operation
Director-General Department 
OficeTrael
Supprt g and Ticketing 
Department 
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aid. Since the EDCF is for concessionary loans only, engineering ser­
vice grants should be provided by KOICA. Currently, the rule of 
thumb is that if the engineering service for the project survey costs 
more than $1 million. [he Project Preparation Loan of EDCF is used 
to cover the cost; if the service costs less than $1 million. KOICA 
provides it as technical assistance. 
The fact that EDCF loans are controlled by the Ministry of Finance 
rather than by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or an independc. aid 
offico is believed to be one reason for tile slow expansion ,!" on­
cessionary loans to developing countries. As in any other country, 
the MOFLmust be less positive towards ODA expansion than tile 
MFA and more concerned with domestic financial stability and the 
balance-of-paymei its position. 
In the major DAC CounLtries. bilateral loans are rarely administered 
by the finance ministry. In Japan, the OECF (Overseas Ecimoinic Co­
operation Fund) is primarily under the authority o1' the Econoni ic 
Planning Agen. USAID, which has primary responsibility for 
administering U.S. ODA inctlding concessionary loans, is Under the 
general aut hority of the State Depilrment, and the USAID director is 
an undersecretary of the State Deparlmont. In Germany, the Federal 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation (lIuMIdesn inisterium lir wiltschaft­
fiche Zusa ilimenarbeit, BMZ) takes overall responsibility for tile aid 
program insf'ar as both financial and technical assistance are con­
cerned. Under the supervision of the BM ', the Kreditanstalt fI'ir 
Wiederaufbau (Reconstruction Loan Corporation, KfW) extends loans 
and grants to deveiofi ng countries. ""The issue of a supervising insti­
tution of the EDCF is expected to become an important problem in 
the administri.tion of Korea's ODA program in tile near future. 
The centralization of aid adi inislration is the donminalt pattern in 
DAC countries. Aid policies are formulated in a separate administra­
tive entity, either independently or Under tile supervision of the 
f-oreign minkitry. This can give the aid program a firm political direc­
tion and facilitate the integration of aid policy with other economic 
34) See Browe (1990), Chap. 8 for other country cases. 
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policies toward developing countries. The creation of KOICA is 
regarded as an imporlant step toward a centralized aid administration 
in Korea. 
If the size of Korean ODA increases more than fi'efold over the 
next five years,"' the aid l face severe shortages ofadminis'ration will 
competent personnel in most areas, including country specialists, 
project economists, and engineering advisers. KOICA should expand 
its stafl so that the agency cai execute [he technical assistance using 
its owi stafl and can strengthen the research of developing countries 
and aid policies. KOICA should also concentrate its energies on de­
velopment assistance and should stop its activities in accommodating 
Korean emigration or helping provide overseas employment for 
Koreans, not to mention tiassport processing and airplane ticketing. 
35) See the next chapter for a di':cussion of the size of Korean ODA in the future. 
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SIX 
Policy Directions for Korea's ODA 
The decade of tile 1990s will be a new era for Korea's ODA program. 
With the first disbursement ofEDCF soft loans in 1989andthe creation ofa 
newaid agency, KOICA, in 1991, Korea will become a substantial aid do­
nor in a fewyears. Korea will be the first mniddle-incoine countlry that has 
transformed itself from being a major recil)ient of foreign aid to a donor of 
substantial aid to deNVeloping countries. The continuous rapid economic 
growill of Korea since the I960s and the resulting high level of per capita 
income have encouraged the idea that Korea is now in a position to be­
come a real member of the donorcountries of the world. 
The admission ofKorea tothe United Nat ions in 1991 and thedi;cussion 
of Korea joining th.- OECD in the mid- I 990s support tile expectation that 
Korea's ODA will increase very rapidly in the next several years. The rapid 
increase in the size of the aid and the increased interest in Korea's ODA 
both from within and from outside the country wiill raise several new im­
portant issues for Korean pol!cymakers. This; chapter will discuss the fu­
ture policy directions forthese issues. 
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The Size of Korean ODA 
ODA officials at the EPB in December 1990 estimated that the proper 
size for Korea's ODA is 0.2 percnt oi'GNP (EPB I990b). Theyofferedthree 
bases for this estimation: Korea's capital subscription to the IMF 
compared with those of 18 DAC countries, the average ODA/Pos'ernient 
budget ratio of the DAC countries, and the Japanese ODA/1NP 
-,,tio in 
1970, when the nominal GNP of'.apaji Was about equal to that of Korea in 
1989. That is,ifKorea was to keep the same share ofIODA as its share in the 
IMF subscription, the same ODA/government budget as the DAC 
countries, and the same ODA/tNP ratio as that of Japan in 1970, then the 
resulting sizeof Korea's ODA for 1989 would beapproxiniatelyequi',alent 
to 0. 2 percent of the year's GNP. The EPI3 officials argued that since the 
actual ODA/GNP ratio in 1989 was far belowthe 0.2 percent level, it was 
appropriatet, 'a! - the 0.2 percent as thc target for 1996, the last yearofthe 
Seventh Fi ve-Year Economic aid Social Development Plan. Thus theODA 
figure in 199)6 is an' icipated to be about S0.8 5billion. 
TheO.2 percent target by 1996 is reiterated in theEPB'sdraft program fr 
the internationalization of the Korean economy during the period of the 
Seventh Five-Yee,- Economic and Social De\ 'opment Plan (EPB 
1990b: 106). But the question of how to achieve the target is not clearly 
dealt with. According to lie EP3 plan,t lie size oft he ODA in terms of norn­
,nal U. S.dollars \%ill increase approximately tenfold in six years, i. e., 
from 1991 to 1996. Since contributions to i-ult ilateral institutions are not 
expected to increase as quickly, most ofthe aid increase must be achieved 
through bilateral ODA. However, neither the MOF nor KOICA have pre­
pared an yconcrete meed ium -term plan that coincides with the EPB target. 
In order to ha ve the volume of Korean ODA increase continuously in the 
1990s, it is necessary to have puLblic support for the policy direction be­
c'use it is primarily tile taxes paid by tile public that finances foreign aid. 
Important issues regarding foreign aid slhuld be discussed in the National 
Assembly and in tlie mass media. 
In most donor countries, levels of public support forthe general concept 
of development assistance is high. But the opinion polls in several indus­
trial countries suggest that aid ranks lower than other more immediate 
64 
concerns in the public's priorities. Express!ons of support for aid are 
greater when the appeal is phrased in terns of humanitarian concern or 
thealleviation of world poverty and hunger (Bu rki and Ayres 1986). In or­
derto fostera positiv'e publicattitude towardaid and achiev'e a dramatic in­
crease in aid, the Korean government should carry out well-conceived 
programs t educate the public about the importance of aid. In this edu­
cation, the benefit that aid can bring to Korea. directly and indirectly, 
should be emphasized. 
Despite the need to increase aid dramatically, Korean policymakers do 
not have to seek a 'proper' aid voltime for Korea in order to rationalize the 
aid expansion policy. There is noeconoinic variable that can determinethe 
proper aid level for a country. The aid performances of individual DAC 
countries over the years do not exhibit close links between tile rate of 
gromlh of GNP and die rate of growth ofaid. Differences between tile per 
capita income of countries cannot explain thedegree of diversity in aid per­
formance. For example, France and the Netherlands have ODA/GNP 
ratios exceeding 0.7 percent but have percapita incomes Wi1fich are below 
the DAC average; on the other hand, the United States and Switzerland 
which have high per capita incomes are at tile bottom of the aid-giving list 
(OECD 1985: 130 - 31 ). There is alsoconsidei. ble variation inthepercent­
age of central government budgets devoted to aid; these shares range frol 
3 percent or morc in the case of Sweden and Switzerland to less than 0.4 
percent in Austna and Ireland for 1988 - 1989 (OECD 1990:189). 
Contr,;ry to what many Koreans believe, joining the OECD does not 
mean that Korea's aid level should sharply rise. At present there are five 
OECD countries \Nfiich are not members of DAC. The total OD A from these 
fivecountries in 1989 was only $0.4 billion (OECD 1990:156). Further, be­
corninga DAC nember does not mean that Korea's OD A/GN Pratio should 
be raised to the DAC - . rage of 0.33 percent. In 1989, the ratio was less 
than 0.2 percent for the United States and Ireland, 0.22 percent for New 
Zealand, and0.23 percentforAustria (OECD 1990:140). 
Considering the current support for Koreanaid on the part ofthe political 
ledders and tile public, which is based oi humanitarian concerns and an 
understanding for the need to contribute to international economic sta­
bility, raising Korea's ODA level to 0.2 percent of GNP in five years seems 
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very difficult to achieve. A target level of 0. 15 percent would be more re­
alistic, yet ambitious. If the 0.2 percent level is achieved bef'ore the year 
2000, Korea'sODA policy would be praised as a modelcase. 
The Types and Country Allocation of Aid 
As the size of aid grows, a larger propoition of Korean aid will be 
channeled through bilateral programs. During 1988 - 1990, 70 percent of 
Korean ODA was multilateral aid. Ii tile case of DAC countries, only 30 
percent was channeled through multilateral institutions. The high pro­
portion ofnmltilateral aid in Korea is not a result of policy intention, but is 
due to the small size of bilateral aid. Since most of the aid increase are 
expected in bilateral loans anrd technical assistance, the proportion ofbi­
lateralaid willcontinue togrowv in the fliture. 
Multilateral aid is generally said to be less political and therefore more 
developmental in its orientation than bilateral aid. At the same time, 
multilateral aid means that control over Korean aid resources is exercised 
by the multilateral institutions and not by the Korean authorities. Thus, if 
the multilateral organizations or the countries that control thes.e 
organizations do not direct aid resources to greater development advan­
tage than what the Korean aulthorities could, then mu Itilateral aid loses its 
relativeadvant,.ge. 
As mentioned above, however, Korea lacks a sufficient supply oflcom­
petent aid staff and experiences with bilateral aid; theretore in some cases, 
aid resources would be better Utilized w'hen they are channeled through 
nut tilateral institutions th in through Korean aid agencies. In particular, 
Korea's cotribution to UN agencies like the UNDP should be increased 
sharply. Korea's contribution to UN agencies in 1989 was less than $, 0 
million and the amount allocaledI to the UNDP was $6: 0,000. )' Howe er, 
vith menbership in the United Nations in September 1991, Korea is 
expected to increase its multilateral aid through UNagencies. 
The UNDP is the largest source ofi ultilateral grant aid with ongoing 
36) Tie total in Table 4.14 includes contributions to nun-UN institutions such as 
GATTand APO. 
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programs in over 130 dev'eloping countries including North Korea. In 
1989, annual disbursements by tile UNDP were over" $900 million 
(Broimwe 1990:24 1). Some 80 percent of UNDP resources are earmarked 
for the least developed countt ies and tile sectors Vwhidl rcCeiVe tile largest 
concentration of UNDIP assistance are agricultue (inclding lorestry and 
fisheries), dCvelopment management, and industry. °lhercfore increasing 
Korea's contribution to UN DP is consistent wit h the policy goals of increas­
ing aid to poorercoiultries. 
Ifthe Korean governm1ent wishes to designate tile Use otflhe Korean con­
tribution. establishing a trust ftund i the UNDI) can be a reasonable policy 
option." The trust fund is a type olflulti-bilateral aid and would be suit­
able fora contry like Korea which is to become a major donor COUntry but 
is not yett fully capable of managing aid projects eflicient ly in developing 
countries. ' 
One of the problems with the Korean bilateral aid prograin is thai a large 
ttmber of countries iecei\ye very small allounts of aid. As Table 4.4 
showed, grant aid of a little over S II million wvas allocated aniong 94 
countries in 1990. Technical assistance has also been stall in olhunme but 
large internsoflthe numberofrecipie -. It1989, lKorea received trainees 
from more than 100 countries. With a budget Of only $0.3 million, the 
Ministry of Science and Technology dispatched 66 experts to 2 1 
countries. 
Korean bilateral aid shoId~t be more concentrated with fewer countries 
receiving it; in this way, the aid woldI conitribtetC more significantly tothe 
developmient of the pool clunitriCs. Rdticing tle nul ber of recipients is 
important fOr increasing the efficiency and Lffect iveness of the Korean aid 
program. Concenttating aid in iewer count ries will also reduce tile cost of 
aid aiim in ist ratiofn. Ftirther, a significant development effect of Korean 
aid illrecipielt COllltlieS would pronm ote closer cooperation between 
Korea and the recipient in econorIIiL or political areas. The nitumber of 
grant aid or technical assistance recipients, :;lould gradually be reduced to 
UNI DO was coincItideif in I989. The fund size is S300 
thousand a year. 
38) By utilizing the inist fund,Korean ofliCiakI do not have to worr'-, aboUt tChe loss of 
Korea's identit,' in tile 
37) A trust fund agreemnent ,illi 
eyes tf recipients. 
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abOtit I/2 or 1/3thle present size. 
In tih,e past, bilateral aid was allocated in such as way thai eve''ry co,[tIy 
thaI reqIest d aILi i I I , t arCrece ived so ntias sista ilce. Di pht Iatc coil ­
sideratitn Of tle Clrt0tatiOtaI sit ahtion with Nohll Korea was a major 
factor detrminiig Ie alh.aloit II I t'aid. Sit tcegrat aid to almost 100 
ct)littri.N Was i~llned ant ,dministctd by o)nly tw) M FA officials, it was 
ilnIssilbl to st le.ss the t'efficie'y o(11 cllutliVeneVSS Of the aid prlogralll 
(MFA I't) ). T daV, io'.,. OICA ilt .. devlopingf:Ol IK, selects 
contieS thtI Will rvciiV vh. gallt aid i,'t.h ilhal assistanc. and dect.ides 
1ow IHInlch a i is t b aIIlloated to i1 lC ItlIIt ries. 
As Ie.nt.io d in ,e'arlier, Rlha and Sotng (1989) alld H. Kim (1990) 
poilaltl tlhat1 
catiolOf ) ilatC.ral aid. LIIiphasis was given IttIhtose variables that eIxhibit a 
degree Ofi tOse c.Ol HOnic ties With KOrea 
itS.llltd i ( 1'ctoishold be i,.:d illdeht.lrmlining tile allo­
alld tile groxIh potential of the 
d e eitt P i]ig~ t )Lintr ie.s. 
The llost ilplOrtant variable in tile se.lctlion ofthe recipient countries, 
lltwever'tr, should be tile need fr the aid t tile pt.,rly o' tile recipi., 
cttrtry wlich is primarily nmeastured by its per capila income. Oher 
'ariables such as the recipietlt c)Llltrv"S i)tLilatioun, tile amount of aid 
received from,Other dtthnors, anid political or ctultural linkage with Korea 
should he cotisidered as %%ell. ]iit Korea's coliiertcial illte.restl notsilld 
be a signiicant variable, at least fr tile allocatitn oit granlt and techtnical 
aid. Ift tin iercial hiterests are letcti Ved illa vider and iuiger-t ern per­
speldwe, aid ser\'Cs dtllSlic collllrcial inlteCrests tIrtltigh tile gromuh 
and stabiliy oI he world econtolll, v'en iftle itlore diret bene l'its notar 
itl ,..edia! ely i' tsned. 
For lietallocatiot of EDCF hains, mtue etmphasis til tilter cipient's 
grtixti h)telllial0 1r recipient's ctlltlllitc ties . ith Koi.a call *eiusti­o th
fie.d bec'tatse. Ilie+htns tlUst be. tepa idatd tIh,. PCprt tject sits nalIly rt]t ire. 
nluch largetl aid anllourts titan doothter aid projects. Faniliarilyof the aid 
Officials iti tile h tan projecls is esseitial in EDCF management. Illthe 
first phaseofKorea's soft hoanexpalrsitn, joint finatcing %'il mltilateral 
orgatizations such as the IBRD Wt,'tuld be a good idea collsidering Ktrea's 
lack ofexperience and tuantpower, as el as the relatively small sizeof' thle 
1,it'.d. 
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Raising the Quality ofAid 
Unlike the DAC countries, Korea's bilateral grant aid has all been col­
modity grants, except for a small amount olcash grants floremergency re­
lief. In tlie future, tIle shareofcash giants should be increased rapidly. This 
can be dorie by limit lug the growx1 1 lfcornmldity grants aid by ircreasinag 
cash grants in %on or in conv,,ible currencies. By doing this, the real 
value of'Korean aid to tile recipients will be itciasedI. Evenltually griants il 
con\vertible currencies ' coilprise tie mahjor poirotio,sllld of lorean grailt 
aid. 
There isa po)puIlara rgunLIenl that since K -ca is still a developing country 
and does n t ciijoy a balate- f-payments sturplus, Korea's bilateral aid 
should be tied aid. But this argdtLilneult iiplicith' assumes that resoLur'Ce 
transfers to foreign coUntries cost much less iflthey do niol take the form of 
direct outfhlow.of loieign exchanges. This assumptioul is plainly wrong. 
Trainsfers in the frrii ofgod s and inlthe form offorcigi exchalnge have tile 
sanme cost as long as tile goods alnd tile forgign excllge have tile same 
valtue illthe w,.orld aikarkct. For Cxanipl, by gi\'ing a miiotor v'ehicle to a 
developing coun yt, Korea loses the OplOtlIrliy of expoilinig tile 'chiclC 
the world market oruthe opportunit\' of utilizilg those resources tor the 
production ofanllimport-subStiting gooLd. Therefore tile beliefit Of t'ing 
the grant aid is much smaller than ian. people believe. The small size 
of the Korean granit aid itself makes the benefit of1aid-tyinig to the IOrean 
ecoiioiiiy negligible. Thus the policy of keeping the provisim of iiachin­
eryaild eqLlilpunit as aI ioiif K )crail grant aid does niot serVe aly lleaii­
ingful purpose. 
Technical assistance is expected to be entipliasized iniKorea's ODA 
program. Yet orily about 10 percentl ofKorea's ODA is giv'en in tefn ical as­
sistance. Many Korean a id officials bel ieve tfiat since Korea is rega rded asa 
model cast-of successfull ecollollC development, Korea's techllical assis­
talnce to d'\'elopiig conlltries \\illmore iclevalit allid therefore more 
ill 

be 
valuable to tile reCiientsi ha 1 ass istanc from de\vehlopd ciiuntries. Blt 
tile maiin problem wNith Koreaii techinical assistance is fiat there are not 
enough specialists, consultants, ild advisers vio cal carry out liheessen­
tial aid fuictions such as teachhirg, advising, trai nirig, and s udyi ug in 
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developing countries. he cuirrent systen of ad hoc aid operation onl a re­
quest basis should be translormed into plamed project ati il selected 
countries. Howe.vr, 1he recruiti g ald training or Korean experts to be 
dispathe+d to dICNelop~i rg Cout ies shoni be place.d onl the top of the 
ODA's budget alloctation list. 
Korea's bilateral aid has mostly taken the form of tlhl)roject aid, i. e., 
Korea's grai lid and Itchnical assislance were provided as general sup­
port f'or the reci ',itColtfit ries' o'rall .e.vCehptl.,rlt objectives rat her lia it 
as support for pa. 'ular sectors or in'. estlme.nt acti%itics. By increasing 
project id, Korea sh(, b' abh. to aI loctate+ii)-e aid rsr r -ce_,s in parlticuilar 
sectors and for part icul, ,bjecti yes that wou'ld raise tihe Cflecivene.ss of 
Korea's aid. For instance, Korean aid Officials calt make sure that [lie aid 
goes to the poor as intendetd or to iy othe.'r inte.'nde.d bne'liciary instead of 
going to thle wealthy or some corrult iolit icians. Anothr advantage of 
pr{Ojct aid is that it ustally results inl spedIfii: otItllis to wviI iclh donors can 
attach theiromiv labels. 
For Korea to be able to increase project aid, ho.ever, more colptl)ettit 
administrators and lre I'Linds to cover the higher administration costs 
are required tharl are n( w a vailabl e. M rre aid will be pro'ided in packages 
since projects usually require both ta pital aid tcln ic, 1assistance. Feasi­
bility studies and preparations arid evaluations of lOIts %%ill require a 
lot of resoui:es. 
Priority projects Wvith tW. la]rgest dtvnient effects ill be difTererit 
depeniding oi tle economic nditions olthe recipients. But the lOctis of 
Korear: aid in the LLDCs shold be on the alle'viation of ptoverty ill rural 
areas and tite dtveb.'. rl nt ofhu ati-.i,r4s(11lces \'LihIlare eSSerit iail tor stis­
tairieti gro'Aih ill dvt'lOping countries. Withot redtrciigetrrue poverty 
in mariy developing cotitris, thit'rt'is littlt' hirrp for st stainabh.,develop­
meit1. Health, ritritioti, housing, familv platning arid other social 
services are essential for improving living conldiliolS ill iheCs. co+unltries, 
and Korea, with its resources anrid expeiieices, (call maktke impotatt 
contribtitions ill these art.as. Tie xpel'irct'.' of Koreta's successfu1tl tievel-
OllllCllt tieriiotlstrates thle crucial illll)laric of qtlality' education and 
tectiical and vocational traintiing for'c()ellOtli c tIeelopienrit. Korea 
should study the aid types that wvill be kst suited flor hile needs of 
70 
developing countries ald the resource supplies of'Korea in tie field ofedu­
catior and training. 
Sinl the 'oltmne of Korean grant aid and technical assistance to any 
country would be sinall compared to those of'major donor count its, large 
projects illindustry, energy or transportation do iot inuatch with Korea's 
supply capacity. These projects, witi tleir coimnercial interests to aid 
donors, voulId be better left for the considerat io oft he EDC Fprogram. 
Special Emphasis on Environment and Population 
Until recently tile do: unat ic inl most dceeloping countries was that 
en'ironmcntal issties were probleins of printary interest to inudus*.rial 
count ries that had caused tile problems iltile first place. Today, however, 
considerable ptiblic attentiont in dc\'eloping cointries is being drawn to 
such global env'ironmernal issues as the ozone layer depletioni aniid earth 
warr ig. Cooperati on bet leen deeClopCd alId devClping cout1nries 
resulted in 1te adoption of li Montreal Protocol on Substances that De­
plete the Ozone Layer, %'hliich beca me effective on January 1,1989."" 
Korea has signed the Prolocol illFebruary 1992. 
It isessential th it all countries act ivly Participate in conffronting global 
envi ronmental issties. One characterislic of the international envirorn­
mental problems is reciprocal externality (Dasgu pta and MJler 1991: 
I19); that is,individtal coitries, whether de 'eloped ordeveloping. con­
tribute to eti vironment aIda ages andiilso suffcr f'rolllthem. Emissions of 
greet; hotise ga ses arei CnexaInlpIe. 
The buildup of greenhouse gases is largely related to the use of 
fossil fuels, which now account for 80 percent of the world's energy 
consutupt ion. But tile cutting and burning of tropical forests also 
add substantially to the buidtup of carbon dioxide. Population pressures, 
poverty, and inalequate land teiure systems all contribuite to environ­
39) The Protocol recjuites paiiipaling Ihiil)n. to free/e the plod ction of CFCS 
(cllrofluoocairbons) at 198(1 levels tntil 1993 and it redtice piodtction by 50 
percent by 1998. The Ponocol alh % de\ethpi g co nt i ies a I I-year grace period 
during ,,hich they an increase CFC and th,1101 CunsAlption to m1eet their basic 
d'illestic Heeds. 
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mental degradation including the cutting and burning of trest:;., Miich 
is to a large extent dueLto the ef'r-increasing need for fuelwood. Poverty 
also pushes towards o'ergrazing and ovearlarming, thus leading to 
deseli ificat ion and soil depleltion. Uh imatcly. such o 'er se Contributes to 
faminei (as in Ethiopia) and deVaSlaling floods (as ill Bangladesh and 
Sudan). Therefore the catses of envi ronnietalll dcgradation are insepar­
able froin dece1opimient problems. 
SinIcC it is evidelt ihal conliluing ellVironmIelntal dcterioration wvill 
threaten thle alclthitClln of sista inall eic onomic devehpnment and an 
ilnro\Vd quality of li[t' fr all, it is essential that Korea, like otherdonor 
(OliltritS, JctiNely' ihlticilCae in helping dCvcfopiug CountrieLJdeal I ith 
past danatw and etcourge lltein to take elvirontenially desirable 
actillS Il ailrcUlar, KorCa shotl d inltCgratC into its devCelitllent assis­
tlC; thC !6Ilh,\Vingl thrC Components of an cnvironnent policy as the oAC 
iiiherW JhaC donC: ( I) sp'cific projectCs alld Iprograimls fOrtpgrading and 
rchabilitating the etvironitlln; (2) cnvi:oi-melltal assessment proce­
dures for 'tradilional' de'Clopmenil aid projects or programs; and (3) 
iea suires to strengthen tie ca pahil it 'of developing countries to deal wit h 
eti'ironmiental issics (OECD 1989: 113). 
As a first step toward imlemnticiatiol ofn llnv'irlnient policy in de­
velopment assista nie, KOICA may recruii aitneivrninmentl adviser or es­
tal ish alnenvironminent Scctio' 'o assist aid off icial<. As a next step, 
Korea's rural development aid may include piojc',s assisting in a fforest­
,lion and soil conlsCrvationl. Establishlicit of a newen\vhoneiltal insti­
tutiot or ile slingthening ()f existing inslitUtiotls and the training of 
journalit s, govenii ent olfficials, teachers, and industrial ii nagers inen­
viroi nental oLuIstionsaralsoar, as in which Korea will beabletocontrib­
tue efficieint ly. 
Conltinued ra pid pll ;tllation growvlh in tinany di'\helopi ng cotiiltries is 
threati'ning to overtake their hopes of aciiev'ing stustainable develop­
mi'ent nld alleviating po \erty. It is expected tht the population in 
devehl,ing countries will grow by at least 850 million pco,)le during 
[he 199, Is (OECD 1989:1 10). For developing countries as a wvhole, the 
projecteC a verage por'-!ation goiml h rate ill tle I990s is expected to be 
lowercd only slightly to0 1.9 percelt from 2. I percent during 1973 
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- I980."" The imiplications ofthis rapid population growth in devehoping 
countries for (he world include environnental damage and increasing 
pressures for migration. 
Developing countries need hligl-quality family planning services. They 
need administiatiye ard managerial capacities to plan effective popu­
lation propramis. As statedearlier, Korea was very success ful ill population 
control and nowcan help developing Countries design and implement an 
effective family planning prograi. Contraceptive Sui pplies and local pro­
duction, training of medical and paramedical personnel, and manage­
ment training are some areas where Korean contributions can be appreci­
,,ted. 
40) World Bank ( 990:159). The most recent UN esti mate oft lihe averagegrolh raie is 
2.0 percent for 1988 - 2000 (OECD 1989:103). 
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